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When scholars contemplate the legal tools available to policymakers for encouraging innovation, they primarily think about patents. If they are keeping up with
the most recent literature, they may also consider grants, prizes, and taxes as means
to increase the supply of innovation. But the innovation policy toolkit is substantially deeper than that. To demonstrate its depth, this Article explores the evolution
of designs that help people with disabilities access the world around them. From
artificial limbs to the modern wheelchair and the reshaping of the built environment, a variety of legal doctrines have influenced, for better and for worse, the pace
and direction of innovation for accessible design.
This Article argues that two of the most important drivers of innovation for accessible design have been social welfare laws and antidiscrimination laws. Both were
responsible, in part, for the revolution in accessibility that occurred in the second
half of the twentieth century. Unlike standard innovation incentives, however, these
laws operate on the demand side of the market. Social welfare laws and antidiscrimination laws increase the ability and willingness of parties to pay for accessible
technology, ultimately leading to greater supply. But in doing so, these laws generate a different distribution of the costs and benefits of innovation than supply-side
incentives. They also produce their own sets of innovation distortions by allowing
third parties to make decisions about the designs that people with disabilities have
to use.
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The law can promote innovation, and it can hinder it. For example, the law’s relationship to the wheelchair, the most important accessibility innovation of the twentieth century, produced both results. Policymakers have choices about which legal
incentives doctrines they can use and how they can use them. This Article evaluates
those tools, and it provides guidelines for their use to encourage accessible technology in particular and innovation generally.
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INTRODUCTION

1 The history of wheelchairs is recounted in the first chapter of HERMAN L.
KAMENETZ, THE WHEELCHAIR BOOK: MOBILITY FOR THE DISABLED 5–35 (1969). But also
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Although wheels and chairs are two of humanity’s oldest technologies, the wheelchair is a surprisingly modern invention.1 Prior to the
1930s, wheelchairs that enabled people with disabilities to access the

R
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see Brandon Stark’s discussion of wheelchair developments in Westeros in Game of
Thrones: The Last of the Starks (HBO May 5, 2019).
2 ELIZABETH GUFFEY, DESIGNING DISABILITY: SYMBOLS, SPACE, AND SOCIETY 49–51
(Bloomsbury Visual Arts 2019) (2018); AIMI HAMRAIE, BUILDING ACCESS: UNIVERSAL
DESIGN AND THE POLITICS OF DISABILITY 53–54 (2017); BESS WILLIAMSON, ACCESSIBLE
AMERICA: A HISTORY OF DISABILITY AND DESIGN 27 (2019). These three recent books
have detailed the rich history of disability and design.
3 See infra Part IV.
4 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 372 (2003) (“A consideration of the economics of
intellectual property would be seriously incomplete without some discussion of the
intersection between intellectual property law and antitrust law.”); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 310–15
(2013) (providing an overview of the traditional theory of patents, prizes, and grants as
ways the government incentivizes innovation while tax credits are neglected by scholars).
5 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 311.
6 Id.
7 See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2019) (documenting
those particular pathways).
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world at large did not exist. Everything began to change with Everest
& Jennings’s (E&J) invention of the collapsible steel wheelchair in
1937. Subsidies to veterans and other people with disabilities made the
wheelchair broadly available, and it revolutionized their abilities to
live, work, and play. But most public and private spaces remained
inaccessible to wheelchairs, and wheelchair innovation stalled for the
next three decades. Not until antidiscrimination laws compelled the
reshaping of the built environment and antitrust laws broke E&J’s
monopoly towards the end of the twentieth century did access and
innovation significantly improve. Engineers, designers, architects, and
activists—many of whom had disabilities—played important roles in
the development of accessible designs, including the modern wheelchair.2 And, for better and for worse, so has the law.3
An astonishing variety of legal doctrines have influenced the pace
and direction of technological progress in designs that assist people
with disabilities—often spurring innovation, but just as often hindering it. Some of these doctrines are standard in accounts of innovation incentives, including intellectual property (IP) laws, antitrust
laws, and research grants and prizes.4 These are supply-side tools that
reduce the costs of design innovation or increase the returns to innovators. For example, patents give inventors exclusive rights that allow
them to charge higher prices for access to their inventions.5 Higher
prices, in turn, help inventors to recoup the costs of their investments.6
Research grants, instead, provide financial incentives upfront that
encourage innovation along particular pathways.7 These supply-side
tools are the central pillars of innovation policy, and policymakers
have used each of them to incentivize accessible design.
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But other legal doctrines have also had important but underappreciated effects on access innovations.8 Central to this account are
two areas of the law that produce demand-side incentives to innovate.
Both social welfare laws and antidiscrimination laws9 have spurred the
creation and dissemination of accessible designs by increasing
people’s willingness and/or ability to pay for them. Government subsidies to veterans for artificial limbs and accessible automobiles boosted
demand, leading manufacturers to increase supply.10 In a related but
far more important way, antidiscrimination laws like the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
encouraged municipalities and private parties to invest in accessible
designs for their buildings, transit systems, and public spaces.11
Yet the innovation policy toolkit is even deeper than this. Other
legal doctrines, like tort law, insurance law, healthcare law, and tax
law, also find roles to play in accessible design. Some of these have
boosted innovation, others have impeded it, and still others have
mixed records. Finally, a vast amount of accessible design is created
without any explicit relationship to the law; it is created by people
with disabilities to solve problems in their lives.12 As it turns out, the
story of the most important accessibility innovation of the twentieth
century—the wheelchair—involves each of these regimes.13
This Article’s contributions are twofold. First, I demonstrate the
myriad policy levers that can influence the pace and direction of innovation for good and for ill. Innovation scholars have recently begun to
look outside the confines of IP law to some of these other fields, and
this Article joins that chorus.14 In doing so, however, this Article con42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 42 Side A
10/08/2020 07:57:54

8 Throughout this Article I use the term “access innovations” to refer to new
technologies, discoveries, information, and learning that aim to influence the abilities of
people with disabilities to access the environment. Some access innovations are particular
technologies or devices that would now fall under the rubric of “assistive technology,” but
others, as I discuss at length below, are based on new information or new understanding
about the ways in which the environment can be changed to make it accessible for people
with disabilities.
9 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2004)
(“In short, the future of disability law lies as much in social welfare law as in
antidiscrimination law.”).
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part IV.
12 For an extended discussion of the increasing ability of users to innovate for
themselves, see generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005).
13 See infra Part III.
14 See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 114 (2003);
Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2016); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV.
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345 (2007); Daniel Jacob Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism,
128 YALE L.J. 544 (2019); Price, supra note 7; Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation
System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45
HOUSING L. REV. 1037 (2008); Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 1991 (2018) [hereinafter Sachs, Administering Health Innovation].
15 Interestingly, one of the first important law review articles about disability law
focused on tort law. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in
the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841 (1966).
16 One of the only studies to consider the relationship between disability law and
innovation law is Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans
with Disabilities Act Part II – Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9 (1998).
17 For example, when trying to determine what counts as a “reasonable
accommodation” under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See infra
notes 273–76 and accompanying text.
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tributes additional legal regimes to the innovation toolkit and demonstrates how these regimes interact with one another in order to foster
or hinder accessible design. Innovation scholars have seldom noticed
the impact of public laws, like antidiscrimination laws, on their field of
study. Recognizing this broader set of policy levers will help scholars
more precisely craft recommendations for spurring innovation.
Second, I introduce disability scholars to the multiple ways in
which doctrines outside of antidiscrimination and social welfare laws
influence accessibility. Virtually all recent scholarship on disability law
focuses on the impact of social welfare laws and antidiscrimination
laws like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, or the Fair Housing Act.15
In doing so, however, it may miss the numerous effects of other legal
regimes—including patent, tort, and antitrust law—on the availability
of accessible designs for people with disabilities.16 This is vitally
important. When policymakers, courts, and scholars consider the
range of designs that can improve accessibility,17 they are likely to
consider the options as given. But accessible designs have histories,
and those histories are influenced by a wide range of legal and nonlegal inputs. If disability scholars wish to comprehensively understand
the potential opportunities for improving access for people with disabilities, they must appreciate the full range of factors that affect accessible design, from intellectual property and antitrust law to tort law
and user innovation. In some cases, accessible design may be more
effectively promoted by relying on or changing one of these other
legal doctrines.
To demonstrate these points, this Article traces the history of
accessible design from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. It begins with crutches and artisanal prostheses, and it
ends with motorized wheelchairs, “universal design,” and the transformation of America’s built environment in response to the ADA—
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which celebrates its thirtieth anniversary in 2020.18 I focus on designs
that address mobility impairments, including both personal devices
like prostheses and wheelchairs as well as the architectural design of
buildings and public spaces. Accordingly, I will not address the considerable and important work on hearing and vision impairments or
mental disabilities.19 Thus, when I use the term “accessible” to
describe designs and innovations, I am referring to those that are
designed to be used by (at least some) people with mobility impairments to improve their access to the environment. And for purposes
of simplicity, when I refer to people with disabilities, I mean people
with mobility impairments. I hope, however, that this work will assist
scholars studying how the law impacts design and innovation for a full
range of impairments.
More concretely, this Article begins to assess the tradeoffs that
policymakers face when choosing how to structure innovation incentives for accessible design. Each of the different innovation regimes
produces benefits, but each is also costly. I evaluate the relative costs
and benefits of patent law, user innovation, social welfare laws, and
antidiscrimination laws from the perspectives of which parties receive
the benefits and which parties bear the costs of each regime. Although
people with disabilities stand to gain under any regime that successfully incentivizes accessible innovation, they are far from the only beneficiaries.20 Nondisabled people, governments, and firms may all
benefit from various sorts of accessible design. Similarly, depending
on the regime, different parties may bear the costs of innovation:
42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 43 Side A
10/08/2020 07:57:54

18 This is not meant to be a comprehensive historical study of design and disability,
although there are several recent works that have detailed this history. See generally
GUFFEY, supra note 2; HAMRAIE, supra note 2; WILLIAMSON, supra note 2. But see
JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 54–89 (2018) and Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability,
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 535–50 (2008) for critiques of
the current antidiscrimination approach.
19 See, e.g., ANGEL ANTKERS, SUSAN MILLER, SOPHIA GALLEHER, BLAKE E. REID &
BRIANNA L. SCHOFIELD, AUTHORSHIP AND ACCESSIBILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: AN
AUTHORS ALLIANCE, SILICON FLATIRONS, AND BERKELEY CENTER FOR LAW &
TECHNOLOGY ROUNDTABLE REPORT (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3254959; Peter David Blanck & Leonard A. Sandler, ADA Title III and
the Internet: Technology and Civil Rights, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 855
(2000); Molly K. Land, The Marrakesh Treaty as “Bottom Up” Lawmaking: Supporting
Local Human Rights Action on IP Policies, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 513 (2018); Caterina
Sganga, Disability, Right to Culture and Copyright: Which Regulatory Option?, 29 INT’L
REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 88 (2015); John F. Waldo, The ADA and Movie Captioning:
A Long and Winding Road to an Obvious Destination, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1033 (2011).
20 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 850–58
(2008) (describing the many positive externalities that nondisabled people receive from
accommodations for people with disabilities).
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21 These are not necessarily the only criteria that could matter to policymakers,
scholars, or activists, but they have been the two most important ones in debates about
accessibility. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare
Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 926–27 (2003) (positioning the ADA as a welfare
reform law to explain why it has not fulfilled equal access for people with disabilities, at
least in the employment context); Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of
Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1297–1306 (2007) (analyzing the implications of
utilitarian consideration of welfare and egalitarianism for disability policy).
22 See infra Part IV.
23 See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
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Sometimes it will be users with disabilities, sometimes competitor
firms, and sometimes insurance companies, property owners, and taxpayers. This analysis offers initial suggestions for how the regimes
compare with respect to the criteria of welfare and fairness in their
distribution of costs and benefits.21
Over the course of this study, a number of important themes
emerge. First, demand-side incentives can be just as powerful as the
supply-side ones that the law typically uses.22 In addition to or instead
of directly encouraging innovators, policymakers can boost demand
for new designs by increasing people’s ability and willingness to pay
for them. Demand-side incentives can also help solve collective action
problems. Both people with disabilities and those without them may
be better off if businesses adopt accessible designs, but they might
face coordination problems that prevent socially valuable changes
from taking place. The ADA relieves the coordination burden by
placing design requirements on businesses.23
Second, accessible design innovation can happen at multiple
levels of usability. Some designs, like an artificial limb, operate at the
individual level—they increase accessibility for a single user at a time.
Other designs, like ramps, elevators, and curb cuts, create accessibility
for many users, whether they have a disability or not. Neither of these
options is uniformly superior to the other, and they often intersect.
Individual-level innovations may be cheaper to produce, but they may
help fewer people, and the opposite may be true for environmentallevel designs. Thus, when policymakers consider how to incentivize
accessible design, they should determine whether it is best to focus on
individual-level or environmental-level innovations.
Third, I analyze how the various innovation regimes can produce
distortions that affect the nature of design. These include the distortions created by exclusive rights, by intermediary decisionmaking, and
by the relative salience of costs and benefits. For example, patents
tend to be useful when market demand is a good proxy for social wel-
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24 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1942 (2013) (“Patents . . . link the expected private returns
. . . to the portion of social value that can be effectively (or cheaply) extracted through the
exercise of exclusionary rights. But there is no reason to think that variations in the ease or
costs of exclusion are correlated with the underlying social value . . . .”).
25 See Samaha, supra note 21, at 1252–53 (explaining how disability policy must be
grounded on normative commitments beyond the social model of disability).
26 Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84
Fed. Reg. 63588 (proposed Nov. 18, 2019) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/18/2019-24700/rules-regarding-the-frequencyand-notice-of-continuing-disability-reviews (last visited May 24, 2020); see also Christopher
Buccafusco & Mariel Talmage, The Trump Administration’s Social Security Rules Will
Harm Innovation in the Assistive Technology Industry and People with Disabilities, 2020
CARDOZO L. REV. DE•NOVO 92.
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fare, but they can skew innovation when this is not the case.24 Distortions also arise when the purchasers of accessible designs are not their
ultimate users, because purchasers’ preferences and users’ preferences
may not align. Finally, all incentives to spur accessible design are
costly, but the incidence and public salience of their costs can vary.
This can lead policymakers to disfavor otherwise effective tools
because the public views them as too expensive. In each case, the pace
or direction of accessible innovation can be misdirected towards inefficient or unfair outcomes.
In this Article, I take for granted that some level of accessible
design innovation is socially valuable, but I do not engage in the
deeper normative debate about the appropriate incentive type or
amount of innovation incentive.25 Doing so would require articulating
and defending positions on welfarism, fairness, distribution, and
autonomy that are far beyond the scope of a single paper. Instead, I
analyze the innovation levers that policymakers can use to produce
whatever amount and variety of accessible design that they deem
appropriate. To do so, I explore the history of accessible innovation to
produce a more contextualized picture of how these policy levers have
succeeded or failed in the past. These lessons have continuing relevance, especially in light of the Trump Administration’s proposed
alterations to Social Security disability payments which could dramatically affect social welfare support and, thus, innovation incentives for
accessible design.26
This Article begins with a brief primer on the innovation policy
toolkit in order to introduce readers to the standard mechanisms that
policymakers use to promote innovation. Part II of this Article traces
the history of accessible innovation from the Civil War to the years
following the Second World War. This period marks the first major
legal efforts to encourage the development of accessible design.
During this period, a number of different innovation regimes operated
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For millennia, humans have solved the problems they have faced
without the need for legal intervention, and many still do today. A
robust and growing literature has shown that many areas of creative

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 44 Side B

to produce new artificial limbs, automobiles for people missing limbs,
and a variety of accessible personal goods. Social welfare laws and
user innovation were the principal drivers of accessible design, but
patents also had a role to play. Part III presents a case study of the
wheelchair and, in particular, the invention of the standard wheelchair
by E&J in the middle of the twentieth century. The E&J wheelchair
was easily the most important accessibility innovation of the twentieth
century, but, as an innovation story, it’s a mixed bag. The wheelchair
was initially the product of user innovation, but unlike most other
users, E&J obtained patents on its design. With these patents, as well
as social welfare subsidies and philanthropy, the firm virtually monopolized the market. As its patents expired, E&J turned to anticompetitive strategies to maintain its monopoly until an antitrust settlement finally opened the market in the late 1970s. Typically this
would mean a rush of other competitors and a flood of new designs,
but other legal doctrines, including tort law and insurance law, may
have slowed their development.
Part IV turns to developments in the design of physical spaces for
accessibility. Designers and architects like Timothy Nugent began to
develop design standards that removed barriers to access for people
with disabilities. These innovations did not take hold on their own,
however. From the 1960s to the 1990s, federal disability law increasingly required entities to adopt standards of accessible design into
their buildings, buses, and public spaces. By threatening legal liability
for noncompliance, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA encouraged
regulated entities to purchase accessible designs. Not surprisingly,
many of them objected to having to bear these costs.
Part V analyzes the various regimes discussed throughout the
Article to offer an outline of the innovation levers that policymakers
can use to encourage accessible design. It contemplates the costs and
benefits of these regimes, including their enforcement costs, and it
considers the welfare and fairness consequences of the distributions
each regime creates. Finally, it explores the distortions that can skew
the pace and direction of innovative design, and it suggests some principles for choosing among these options.
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activity are largely untouched by law.27 People may be influenced by
intrinsic desires, social norms, or other market structures that
encourage creative activity.28 And often, people create new products
simply because they recognize a need or opportunity in their own
lives, and they devise a solution to it.29
The legal system, however, often operates on the premise that
incentives are necessary to stimulate innovation. Innovation is a costly
activity.30 Typically, people must obtain years of education to learn
the tools of their trade. Then, whether they join firms or work on their
own, they must spend considerable time and resources developing
designs, testing them, and reworking them until they produce something that works.31 These research and development (R&D) investments can be enormous, and, according to the standard innovation
policy story, inventions will be undersupplied unless innovators are
given special help to recoup their investments.32
This is where innovation policy’s incentive tools enter the picture.
These days, when people think about incentivizing innovation, they
likely think about utility patents.33 Utility patents allow the creators of
new inventions to secure exclusive rights to make and sell their inven-
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27 For a sustained account of IP’s “negative spaces” in areas of creativity such as
fashion design, cuisine, and comedy routines, see KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER
SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012).
28 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 111–12 (2006) (noting the role of
intrinsic motivation in peer production); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No
Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) (“[I]n stand-up
comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law.”); Aaron Perzanowski,
Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 513 (2013) (“[T]attooers rely on a set of
informal social norms to structure creative production and mediate relationships within
their industry.”); Betsy Rosenblatt, Belonging as Intellectual Creation, 82 MO. L. REV. 91
(2017) (discussing belonging’s importance to creativity and intellectual property law);
Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007) (examining the dynamics at play in fandom creativity).
29 See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 12, at 25.
30 See Suzanne Scotchmer & Stephen M. Maurer, Institutions: A Brief Excursion
Through History, in SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 1, 1 (2004)
[hereinafter INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES] (“The United States currently devotes about
2.6 percent of GDP—$264 billion—to research and development.”).
31 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 294.
32 See id.
33 Utility patents focus on encouraging new “useful” features rather than new
“ornamental” or aesthetic product features as design patents do. See Christopher
Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75,
76–78 (2018). Thus, utility patents are more relevant to this Article’s focus on accessibility,
although design patents could also cover many of the innovations that will be discussed
below.

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 45 Side B

10/08/2020 07:57:54

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-4\NYU402.txt

962

unknown

Seq: 11

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5-OCT-20

9:22

[Vol. 95:952

tions for twenty years.34 Because the patent holders have these rights,
they may be able to sell products that embody their inventions for
prices above the marginal cost of production.35 Thus, for example,
although a medication may only cost several dollars to manufacture,
when it is covered by a patent, the patentee can charge many times
that price for access to the drug.36 The promise of supracompetitive
profits can encourage innovation because innovators will have more
confidence in their ability to recoup their R&D costs.
However, patents are far from the only means of encouraging
innovation. One of the biggest drivers of scientific research is the
system of federal, state, and private grants.37 For example, the
National Institutes of Health provides more than $32 billion in support for biomedical research each year.38 Unlike patents, which begin
only after R&D has substantially finished, grants deliver funding
upfront. In addition, grant funding is based on the preferences of the
funding agency, usually a central planner,39 whereas patent-based
incentives are derived from the market. Innovators relying on patents
as an innovation incentive must strive to provide products that consumers want to buy.40
Policymakers have even more tools to spur innovation. They may
offer financial prizes to the first innovator to solve a particular
problem,41 or governments can provide tax incentives for investments
in R&D.42 All of these are means for putting money into innovators’
pockets to offset their expenses. In this sense, they are all supply-side
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34 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title,
such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending
20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United
States . . . .”); id. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
35 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 297–98.
36 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1562 (2006) (discussing the
importance of patents to ensure pharmaceutical company profits); Arti K. Rai, Fostering
Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and
Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 814 & n.3 (2001) (same).
37 See Price, supra note 7, at 3–4.
38 Grants & Funding, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/grants-funding (last
visited May 24, 2020).
39 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 321.
40 See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 24.
41 See Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 119–21; Burstein & Murray, supra note 14, at 403
(noting the past and present practice of offering prizes to encourage development of
inventions); Heidi Williams, Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to Policy,
31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 752 (2012) (discussing how to evaluate the effectiveness of
innovation inducement prizes).
42 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 322–23.
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incentives. They goad creators into supplying new and valuable products that they might not otherwise produce.
Importantly, all of these incentives are costly.43 Whether it’s
through higher consumer prices or expenditures of government revenue, innovation incentives are expensive. Policymakers, then, must
select the right mix of incentives to optimally encourage innovation.44
Scholars are increasingly attending to the tradeoffs that policymakers
face when choosing among these regimes,45 but this exercise will only
succeed if we appreciate the full range of innovation incentives available. The remainder of this Article demonstrates their interaction in
the context of accessible design, and it introduces other legal tools
into the mix.
II
THE ORIGINS

OF

REGULATION
INNOVATION

FOR

ACCESSIBLE
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Diseases and wars have been the principal causes of physical
impairment, yet they have also generated some of the greatest
advances in innovations for disabled access. The years between the
Civil War and the Second World War evidence rapid technological
development in accessible design in response to impairments caused
by war, disease, and industrial labor. This period also represents the
first major engagement of the U.S. legal system in response to the
perceived challenges of disability. As this Part will demonstrate, progress in accessible design came from a variety of sources in the years
between the Civil War and the Second World War. Importantly, many
of the most important technical advances throughout this period owed
their origin to incentives beyond the traditional legal policy levers of
patents, grants, and prizes. Although these are the tools that modern
societies typically use to encourage innovation, they were only one
piece of this story. Finally, virtually all of the designs discussed below
operate at the individual level—they allow the particular person using
the technology to gain access to the built environment. During this
period, innovation focused on helping people with disabilities adapt to
an inaccessible environment rather than on adapting the environment
for people with disabilities.
43
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See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 551–52.
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1580 (2003); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 558–93 (proposing an “original
taxonomy” for policymakers to combine IP and non-IP approaches).
45 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14.
44
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A. Social Welfare, Innovation Incentives, and Artificial Limb
Production
Prior to the twentieth century, the most important technologies
for providing people with disabilities access to the world at large were
crutches and prostheses.46 Originally, and continuing into the twentieth century, these items were often bespoke creations produced by
artisans for individual users.47 The onset of the American Civil War
substantially increased demand for assistive technologies from the
thousands of soldiers who lost arms and legs.48 Modern machinery,
including railroads and factories, also caused thousands of injuries
every year.49 Advances in medicine meant that injuries that would
previously have killed people were now survivable.50 At this early
stage, several major innovation incentives were already at work.
First, many of America’s artificial limb manufacturers were themselves amputees, and they used this status both to experiment with the
best means of creating new limbs and to establish their authority as
knowledgeable inventors.51 They often had backgrounds in mechanical work that enabled them to reconceptualize the means of building,
attaching, and moving artificial arms and legs.52 And their status as
amputees was commercially valuable, giving credence to the quality of
their inventions. The inventor James Foster advertised:
I claim to be the only PATENTEE and MANUFACTURER in
America (and perhaps in the world) who wears a full length artificial leg and who was a practical mechanician at the time of amputation, and that no other manufacturer has had the same facilities for
42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 46 Side B
10/08/2020 07:57:54

46 Cf. Stephen Mihm, A Limb Which Shall Be Presentable in Polite Society, in
ARTIFICIAL PARTS, PRACTICAL LIVES: MODERN HISTORIES OF PROSTHETICS 282–83
(Katherine Ott et al. eds., 2002) (describing the increasing need for prosethetics during the
industrial age).
47 See HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 54; BETH LINKER, WAR’S WASTE: REHABILITATION
IN WORLD WAR I AMERICA 103 (2011) (“The prosthetist would rework the leg and the
socket numerous times until the fit was acceptable to both the patient and the limb
maker.”).
48 See Mihm, supra note 46, at 282–83.
49 See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 23–24 (2004) (noting
industrial accidents appeared to “overshadow” the thousands of war deaths); Mihm, supra
note 46, at 282 (“The flywheels and pulleys of the new mills and factories severed arms and
legs with alarming frequency throughout the nineteenth century, as did the wheels of
railroad locomotives . . . .”); John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American
Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement,
114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 702–04 (2001) (explaining how tort law adjusted to the increasing
accident rates from manufacturing and railroads); cf. id. at 769–70 (noting the thousands of
injury victims without a remedy as tort law attempted to catch up to modern times).
50 See WITT, supra note 49, at 25.
51 See HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 53–54; LINKER, supra note 47, at 99–100, 105.
52 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 105.
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experimenting with and improving artificial limbs that I have
had . . . .53

53

10/08/2020 07:57:54

HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 53–54.
LINKER, supra note 47, at 105.
55 Cf. id. (discussing J.F. Rowley’s motivation coming “out of frustration with the
prosthetic legs available on the market”).
56 See VON HIPPEL, supra note 12, at 10–11.
57 Mihm, supra note 46, at 283.
58 This is the standard story about how patent law’s exclusive rights convey incentives
to innovate. See supra Part I.
59 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
1745, 1771–72 (2012) (suggesting that some inventors may care about invention as a
reflection of self-identity); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 664–79
(2002) (discussing the information value of patents).
60 Witt, supra note 49, at 694 (“In the second half of the nineteenth century, the United
States experienced an accident crisis . . . like none any Western nation has witnessed since.
By the turn of the century, one worker in fifty was killed or disabled for at least four weeks
each year because of a work-related accident.”).
61 Cf. LINKER, supra note 47, at 56 (mentioning the thousands of British disabled
soldiers returning after World War I).
54

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 47 Side A

Presumably, designers like Foster and William Carnes, the creator of
the popular “Carnes arm,”54 were driven, at least initially, by the limitations and shortcomings of existing medical devices.55 They were, in
contemporary terminology, user innovators.56
While these inventors may have been motivated to solve accessibility problems that they themselves faced, they occasionally turned to
the patent system in an attempt to secure financial reward for their
efforts. Stephen Mihm reports that inventors submitted 167 patents
for prosthetic devices between 1846 and 1873.57 With the growing
market for prosthetics, the exclusive rights offered by patent protection may have offered a means for capturing a larger share of it.58 It is
also possible, however, that the value of a patent to these inventors
had less to do with conveying exclusive rights than it did with constituting a legal recognition of innovativeness and achievement. Inventors may have cared less about the ability to use their patents to sue
other manufacturers than they did for the signaling value that the patents conveyed to purchasers—and perhaps, to themselves.59
User innovation and patent protection were both operating on
the supply side of disabled access innovations in the second half of the
nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, but major changes
were happening on the demand side as well. Throughout this period,
industrial accidents produced “an accident crisis like none the world
had ever seen.”60 First the Civil War and then World War I created
thousands of disabled veterans who desired assistive technologies.61
Their numbers grew ever greater after the Second World War largely
because other technological changes meant that more injured soldiers
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than before were surviving their wounds. The ready availability of
penicillin by the 1940s, coupled with surgical improvements, meant
that many amputees and paraplegics would not only survive the battlefield but also have substantial life expectancies.62 Many of these
veterans wanted to return to work on farms or in factories, and they
desired technologies that would enable them to do so.63 Their injuries,
however, often left them unable to find jobs and earn the income necessary to purchase expensive protheses.64 While veterans may have
been willing to pay for access to innovations, they often lacked the
means to do so.
As Beth Linker recounts, unemployed veterans were political
boogeymen in the decades following the Civil War as “dragging the
nation down a path toward moral and economic decline.”65 The pensions paid to Civil War veterans cost the federal government more
than fighting the war itself.66 Whole political campaigns revolved
around the issue of veterans’ pensions.67 Accordingly, as the specter
of hundreds of thousands of new veterans loomed in the twentieth
century, the federal government adapted its social welfare system for
pensioners away from mere financial support and towards “rehabilitation.” Writing on the eve of the First World War, the orthopedic surgeon Gwilym Davis expressed the anxiety starkly:
A cripple is a menace both to himself and the community and is apt
to become a burden on his relatives, his friends and the public. The
aim then is to improve his physical condition and character as to
make him . . . self-supporting, self-respecting, self-reliant and able
and willing to take and perform his part in the communal life.68
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62 See Brian Woods & Nick Watson, The Social and Technological History of
Wheelchairs, 11 INT’L J. THERAPY & REHABILITATION 407, 408 (2004).
63 See SARAH F. ROSE, NO RIGHT TO BE IDLE: THE INVENTION OF DISABILITY, 1840S1930S, at 212 (2017) (discussing barriers to veterans’ ability to return to work).
64 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 37, 55–56 (noting the connection between disability
and poverty or concern that it meant inability to work).
65 See id. at 12, 21–34; see also THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND
MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992)
(documenting the evolution of Civil War pensions); Rabia Belt, Ballots for Bullets?:
Disabled Veterans and the Right to Vote, 69 STAN. L. REV. 435, 462–68 (2017) (detailing the
widespread social and political contempt of soliders following the Civil War); Peter David
Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions and the
Politics of Disability in America, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2000).
66 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 12; Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 10.
67 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 21–34.
68 Id. at 37 (quoting Gwilym G. Davis, President’s Address, 12 AM. J. ORTHOPEDIC
SURGERY 1 (1914)).
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Injured veterans were to be “fixed” and returned to the labor force as
quickly as possible.
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69 See id. at 37; Belt, supra note 65, at 451 (noting that although amputations were the
most visible disability caused by the Civil War, mental illnesses were the predominant
ones). The U.S. government passed laws to assist with the rehabilitation of returning
veterans. See, e.g., Vocational Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 65-178, 40 Stat. 617 (1918).
70 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 37 (discussing welfare reform’s emphasis on
productive capacity in this period).
71 See HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 51 (“Following the Civil War, the U.S. federal
government offered subsidies for the invention and manufacture of artificial limbs for
soldiers, creating a marketplace for new innovations in prosthetics. As the new
technologies proliferated, inventors advertised their products by claiming their authority to
know and make these devices.”).
72 LINKER, supra note 47, at 98.
73 See id. at 99, 101.
74 See id. at 37 (noting the link between disability and poverty).
75 See Mihm, supra note 46, at 292 (discussing the disparity in artificial limbs available
to the working class versus wealthier classes).
76 LINKER, supra note 47, at 108–10.
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Rehabilitation following war wounds took many forms,69 but
throughout this period, policymakers and veterans groups argued that
veterans, especially those who had lost limbs, needed more than pensions or job training. They needed to be able to purchase technologies
that would enable them not just to work but also to get to work in the
first place.70 In the years following the Civil War, and again after the
First and Second World Wars, the federal government created programs that subsidized veterans’ purchases of artificial limbs and
encouraged innovation in new technology.71 Amputee veterans of the
Civil War were given “limb allowances” that enabled them to
purchase artificial limbs.72 By the end of World War I, the federal government had gone further, both by investing in artificial limb innovation at Walter Reed Hospital and by mandating that veterans wear the
artificial limbs that they were given.73
In these situations, the government’s disability policy was operating as a demand-side innovation incentive. Wounded veterans were
unlikely to be wealthy in the first place, and their disabilities further
decreased their earnings.74 Although they may have wanted to
purchase expensive artificial limbs, without government allowances
they often would not have been able to afford them.75 In an economic
sense, wars created increased willingness to pay for assistive technology, but they also limited veterans’ ability to pay for it. Government subsidies and pensions boosted that ability to pay, and firms
rushed to meet it. For example, in 1917, Albert Follett introduced the
E-Z-Leg, a mass-produced artificial leg made of vulcanized fiber that
could be made available to veterans for only twenty dollars, one-tenth
of the price of standard wooden legs.76 The administrators at Walter

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 48 Side B

10/08/2020 07:57:54

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-4\NYU402.txt

968

unknown

Seq: 17

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5-OCT-20

9:22

[Vol. 95:952

Reed were pleased with the E-Z-Leg’s modular construction, which
allowed them to mix and match parts for each veteran.77
Importantly, however, the goals of policymakers, orthopedists,
and administrators did not always match up with veterans’ preferences. That the government had to require artificial limb use suggests
that many veterans preferred not to use a prosthesis or that they were
satisfied with a common peg leg.78 But while peg legs were even
cheaper and often just as functional as the more sophisticated options,
Charles Silver, the limb program administrator at Walter Reed in the
years after World War I, viewed the peg leg as a means for veterans to
garner sympathy and alms rather than rejoin the work force.79 Silver
cared about more than how well the leg would work or how much it
would cost; for him, the limb’s aesthetics mattered too.80 Yet to
soldiers who actually had to use it, the E-Z-Leg could be “unreliable
and uncomfortable,” and, despite the government’s best efforts, many
of them found that they could adapt to their conditions more easily
without a prosthesis.81
B. Getting Veterans Behind the Wheel
New technology that enabled amputee veterans to walk and to
work was important, but even before the Second World War ended,
many veterans groups realized that their post-war employability
would also depend on their ability to get to work.82 In the 1940s, the
forces of social welfare laws and corporate research combined to offer
disabled veterans a solution. While many amputee veterans were

10/08/2020 07:57:54

Id. at 110.
See id. at 101.
79 Id. at 113 (“The E-Z-Leg . . . provided Silver with a solution to the societal fear that
World War I ex-servicemen would expect charitable handouts as their predecessors
had. . . . [T]he hope behind the E-Z-Leg was that it would prevent veterans from misusing
their artificial limbs as a means to garner unwarranted sympathy or alms.”); see also SUSAN
M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC (2009) (discussing the history of
“ugly laws” that banned “unsightly beggars” in public); Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics
of Disability, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (2019) (proposing a framework for acknowledging
the role of aesthetics in the fight for disability rights).
80 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 112 (“For Silver, artificial legs were more than mere
tools for standing and support—they were symbols, material entities that embodied
sociopolitical fears and hopes, artificial devices embedded with stories from the past and
visions for the future.”). Stephen Mihm suggests that similar issues arose with artificial
limbs in the years following the Civil War, where Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. urged the
adoption of limbs that would “be presentable in polite society.” Mihm, supra note 46, at
288 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Human Wheel, Its Spokes and Felloes,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1863, at 574).
81 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 118.
82 See, e.g., GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 51 (“[D]riving was encouraged as part of veterans’
recuperation.”).
78
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83 See id. (“Several major automakers concurred, with Ford and Oldsmobile providing
adaptations to some of their most popular automobile makes. At Birmingham Hospital the
program was so successful that the patient parking lot was informally dubbed ‘Oldsmobile
Row.’” (citation omitted)); see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 33 (cataloguing the
variety of adaptations from automobile makers).
84 See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 49 (“This new mobility was also egalitarian. White and
non-white, rich and relatively poor, able-bodied and disabled all had access to the road,
and all the freedoms it implied.”).
85 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 33.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 34.
88 Id.; PARALYZED VETERANS OF AM., AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE PARALYZED
VETERANS OF AMERICA 7 (1985); ROGERS, Edith Nourse, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES:
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/R/ROGERS,Edith-Nourse-(R000392)/ (last visited June 3, 2020).
89 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 34.
90 Id.
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rehabilitating their injuries at military hospitals, they were provided
with automobiles from the major car manufacturers that had been
modified with controls adapted to drivers with disabilities.83 The
soldiers who practiced driving the cars in the hospital parking lot realized that the car was a key feature of mid-century American independence.84 To them, the use of a car was as much a part of their
reintegration into society as was a seeing-eye dog, a wheelchair, or a
prosthetic limb.85 The automakers, for their part, saw the opportunity
to burnish their public image and a new market during a period of
rationing that had curtailed their ability to sell cars.86
Again, though, disabled veterans might have been willing to pay
for these expensive new automobiles, but in the majority of cases they
simply would not have been able to afford them. Accordingly, veterans groups began lobbying federal and state governments to provide
specific allowances that would enable them to purchase accessible
vehicles. They found a supporter in Representative Edith Nourse
Rogers, one of the drafters and sponsors of the G.I. Bill.87 With her
backing, Congress passed legislation that provided a $1600 automobile
subsidy for veterans who had lost the use of one or both legs.88 Unsurprisingly, demand for the subsidy was robust. Tens of thousands of
veterans applied, and more than fifteen thousand of them received
new automobiles within the first fourteen months since the bill’s passage.89 The governmental allowance had a demand-boosting effect,
enabling veterans to purchase accessible technologies at a higher rate
than they would have in its absence.
The automobile allowance was one of the first successful collaborations between government and mass-market commercial producers
rather than between government and specialized manufacturers of
medical devices.90 As an innovation story, however, the automobile
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subsidy is not quite so straightforward. Many of the automakers had
already developed the necessary technology prior to the subsidy’s passage.91 Perhaps they were innovating in expectation of forthcoming
demand, but it’s also possible that the innovations would have
emerged in the absence of the subsidy.
Of course, fewer veterans would have been able to take advantage of the innovation in the absence of a government subsidy, so
from their perspective, at least, governmental action was essential to
widespread technological diffusion. But other details complicate the
story. First, most of the innovation was directed towards veterans who
had lost one or both legs, while fewer options emerged for armless
veterans.92 Next, many of the veterans who received the subsidy found
that it was not well adapted to their needs. The allowance was only to
be used for purchasing new cars, but some veterans found that $1600
was not enough to purchase a new vehicle with automatic transmission—one of the most important technological developments for
drivers with disabilities.93 According to one veteran:
At that time the law said you had to purchase the car for $1600.
Well, you couldn’t get a car with an automatic transmission for
$1600. So what we had to do was buy a Chevrolet, say, have it
rigged up with all sorts of crazy controls to prove you could drive it,
then sell it. It wasn’t hard to do because it was right after the war
and cars were rationed to dealers. So we had no trouble getting our
Oldsmobiles once we got rid of this $1600 or less car . . . .94

91
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See id. at 33.
See id. at 34 (noting Edith Nourse Rogers’s observation that upper-limb amputees
and the blind encountered serious access barriers).
93 Id. at 90.
94 PARALYZED VETERANS OF AM., supra note 88, at 6 (quoting founding member
George Hohmann).
95 See Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 809, 831 (1966) (“It is the agency of welfare, not the recipient, who decides
what life goals are to be followed, . . . what services are appropriate, . . . and what funds
allocated to each. In short, the recipient is told what he wants as well as how much he is
wanting.”).
92
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As with the case of artificial limbs, the nature of the innovation incentive distorted the supply of assistive technologies away from the preferences of users with disabilities. Here again, intermediaries’
demands—in this case, automakers’ desire to sell new cars—created
an incentive mechanism that was not as well adapted to the needs of
users with disabilities as it could have been if, for example, the veterans had simply been given a subsidy to purchase accessible
technology.95
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However successful the automobile allowance may have been for
disabled veterans, it had little sustained effect thereafter. The allowance augmented demand for accessible technology by increasing veterans’ ability to pay for new vehicles. But when the subsidy
disappeared, so did the technology.96 Disabled civilians in the years
after the war had to “work[ ] directly with mechanics to develop and
install their own designs.”97 When demand-boosting incentives produce individual-level innovations like this, availability of the innovation may tend to wane once the incentive is removed.98
C. Innovation by Users with Disabilities

10/08/2020 07:57:54

96 Cf. Mary Tremblay, Audrey Campbell & Geoffrey L. Hudson, When Elevators Were
for Pianos: An Oral History Account of the Civilian Experience of Using Wheelchairs in
Canadian Society. The First Twenty-Five Years: 1945–1970, 20 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 103,
107 (2005) (“Hand-controls for automobiles were developed specifically for WW II
veterans in 1945 by automobile companies. Production ceased once the veterans’ needs
had been met.”).
97 Cf. id. (noting the challenges of Canadian civilians with disabilities who attempted to
obtain cars with hand controls).
98 One could imagine situations in which consumers are simply unaware of their needs
for a new piece of technology, and the demand-side incentive helps more people figure out
that they desire the technology. Cass Sunstein, for instance, uses the example of backup
cameras on automobiles as an experience good that has an initially unclear value. Cass R.
Sunstein, Rear Visibility and Some Unresolved Problems for Economic Analysis (with
Notes on Experience Goods), 10 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 317, 328 (2019).
99 See, e.g., Liz Jackson, Opinion, We Are the Original Lifehackers, N.Y. TIMES (May
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/disability-design-lifehacks.html.
100 See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY 17, 70 (2005).
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Access innovations in the middle of the twentieth century didn’t
only come from governments or corporations, they weren’t always
supported by patents or grants, and they didn’t only focus on veterans.
Throughout this period, thousands of people with disabilities created
and shared solutions to accessibility issues in their homes, workplaces,
and leisure activities. Often these were tweaks to existing gadgets—
the sorts of things that we would now call “life hacks.”99 Even the
smallest of them could meaningfully improve people’s lives, while
others completely reshaped our understanding of disability and access.
Perhaps the most fascinating cohort of user innovators in the
middle of the twentieth century were survivors of polio. The disease
affected hundreds of thousands of Americans during this period,
causing varying degrees of paralysis, including respiratory paralysis
and quadriplegia.100 Thanks again to improved medicine and surgery,
many paralyzed polio victims survived far longer than they would
have previously. Yet while the March of Dimes raised millions of dol-
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101 See, e.g., id. at 151 (detailing a “record-breaking $55 million March of Dimes
campaign in January 1954”).
102 TOOMEYVILLE GAZETTE, July 1955, http://www.polioplace.org/sites/default/files/files/
Toomeyville_Gazette_July_1955.pdf; see WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 74–76.
103 TOOMEYVILLE GAZETTE, supra note 102, at 1, 3, 7.
104 See TOOMEYVILLE GAZETTE, Sept. 1957, at 9, http://www.polioplace.org/sites/
default/files/files/Toomeyville_Gazette_September_1957.pdf.
105 Id.
106 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 76, 82.
107 TOOMEYVILLE JR. GAZETTE, Summer 1959, http://www.polioplace.org/sites/default/
files/files/Toomeyville_Jr_Gazette_Vol._2_No._2_Summer_1959_OCR.pdf; see id. at
11–14 (noting equipment ideas from Canada, California, North Carolina, and Ohio).
108 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 74.
109 See id. at 87–88.
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lars for polio research and treatment,101 polio survivors found that
they were largely responsible for handling their own daily needs.
At home, work, and play, polio survivors innovated customized
technologies that enriched their lives, and they shared their innovations with others. In the 1950s, Sally Russell and Ruth Shema, both
respiratory polio survivors, or “respos” as survivors would eventually
call themselves, began publishing a newsletter called the Toomeyville
Gazette for polio survivors at the Toomey Pavilion rehabilitation
center in Ohio.102 The first issue dealt with mundane matters like the
Christmas card sale and recognition of the doctor, nurse, and aide of
the month.103 By the release of the September 1957 issue, the Gazette
began featuring descriptions of innovative problem solving that others
might try.104 In that issue, a man named Don Kollar reported that he
had jerry-rigged his station wagon to power his respirator on car trips
to and from the hospital.105 Subsequent issues became increasingly
devoted to technological issues and adaptations, including a regular
“Equipment” column, descriptions of do-it-yourself fixes called
“Oddments and Endments,” and a classified advertisement section
that was limited to sellers who themselves had disabilities.106 By 1959,
the issue had grown to forty-four pages in length, and it reached
readers from across the U.S. and Canada.107 Throughout its history,
the Gazette “boast[ed] an all-female editorial board of ‘three horizontal respos’—women paralyzed by polio—and two nondisabled
‘vertical volunteers’ whom these women had met at the Toomey
Pavilion rehabilitation center.”108
Examples of user innovations included dozens of varieties of
mouthsticks adapted to a host of different uses such as painting,
writing, and typing.109 The editors relied on these tools both to publish
issues and for their entertainment. Other innovations involved modifications to commercial medical equipment and switches that allowed
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110 Id. at 71; Engineer-Inventor, TOOMEY J GAZETTE, Indian Summer 1960, at 23, http://
www.polioplace.org/sites/default/files/files/Toomey_J_Gazette_Vol_3._No._2_Summer_
1960_OCR.pdf.
111 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 71, 84–86. Similar user innovations were published by
Paraplegia News, a periodical published by the Paralyzed Veterans of America. Id. at 76.
112 TOOMEY J GAZETTE, Fall–Winter 1962, at 33, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/
read/45180434/toomey-j-gazette-vol-5-no-2-fall-winter-1962-polio-place (describing the
“SWITCH-O-MATIC” that “was invented by Herb Merrill, an electronics design engineer,
who is almost totally paralyzed by polio, to fulfill his own need for more independence”);
id. at 51 (advertising automotive hand controls, car hoists, and electric page turners, for
instance).
113 Alice Loomer, Hanging onto the Coattails of Science, REHABILITATION GAZETTE,
1982, at 30 (emphasis omitted). Note that this is the same publication as the Toomeyville
Gazette, Toomeyville Jr. Gazette, and Toomey j Gazette.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 See discussion infra Section V.A.
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people to operate multiple appliances from a single location.110 Still
others offered suggestions for modifying living environments to make
them accessible, convenient, and safe.111
The contributors to the Gazette seemed pleased that others might
learn from their efforts, and they were happy to share their personal
successes with others. Some referred to themselves as “inventors,”
and some offered their services as commercial transactions in the classified section.112 But for the most part, formal intellectual property
law was far from contributors’ minds. One exception was Alice
Loomer, a rehabilitation psychologist and respiratory polio survivor
herself. Loomer lamented the inability of “scientists and technologists” to “picture[ ] our real needs in practical (and cheap) terms.”113
People with disabilities often needed simple, inexpensive solutions,
but, relative to nondisabled people, they made up a much smaller
market.114 Manufacturers and corporations, however, “need products
so complicated that they have exclusive rights.”115 Here, Loomer
pointed out a distortion in the market for innovation caused by the
patent regime. Many of the products that people with disabilities
needed were too simple to obtain patent rights, but firms wouldn’t
invest in creating products unless they could be confident of obtaining
a meaningful return.116 Firms would either create products that were
too complicated to be used (and paid for), or they would simply avoid
the market entirely.
Decades before modern antidiscrimination laws, a variety of legal
and non-legal factors were already shaping innovation in accessible
design and improving opportunities for people with disabilities. These
included both supply-side incentives like patents and demand-side
incentives like social welfare payments. User innovations also supplemented the availability of accessible designs. I now turn to another
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user innovation that completely reshaped disability and access: the
modern wheelchair.
III
THE WHEELCHAIR: A CASE STUDY IN ACCESS
INNOVATION INCENTIVES

A. Before E&J
Before the middle of the twentieth century, most wheeled chairs
were designed for indoor use by wealthy people.120 The wheelchairs
developed in the eighteenth century had small wheels that prevented

10/08/2020 07:57:54

117 See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 20; see also KAMENETZ, supra note 1, at 8–13
(describing the limited use of wheeled chairs in ancient societies).
118 See Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 407–08.
119 See infra Sections III.B, C.
120 See Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 407–08.
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For most of human history, people with disabilities in search of
mobility aids were limited to canes, crutches, and walking sticks.117
Wheeled chairs have been used for centuries, but until the midtwentieth century they were largely devices for wealthy people, and
their principal uses were at home or in institutions.118 Everything
changed dramatically with the introduction of the modern wheelchair
by Herbert Everest and Harry Jennings in the 1930s. Everest and
Jennings began as user innovators, but they secured patents on their
inventions and used them to capture almost ninety percent of the
market for wheelchairs in the United States. But by the time their
patents expired, Everest & Jennings, Inc. (E&J) had stopped innovating and turned to other measures to restrict competition, ultimately
leading to an antitrust lawsuit by the Department of Justice in 1979.
Only thereafter did the market for innovation in wheelchair design
open up, but E&J’s activities had altered the landscape of disability,
access, and innovation in myriad ways, both literally and
figuratively.119
The story of wheelchair innovation is monumentally important to
understanding the law’s effects on accessible design. The creation and
dissemination of the modern wheelchair exhibit the influence of
numerous legal and non-legal innovation levers, and they demonstrate
how these levers can both promote and impede development of accessible design. Moreover, the widespread diffusion of the modern
wheelchair enabled the next stage of the law’s response to disability—
the creation and dissemination of design codes that would be mandated by antidiscrimination law.
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See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 22–27.
Id. at 25.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 27.
125 See id.; Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 407 fig.1.
126 GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 32.
127 See id. at 32–33 (noting the increasingly limited use of wheelchairs outside of
hospitals); see also U.S. Patent No. 40,547 (issued Nov. 10, 1863) (granting a patent to
Charles L. Bauder); U.S. Patent No. 150,022 (issued Apr. 21, 1874) (granting a patent to
Peter Gendron).
128 See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 32; Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 407.
122
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them from being taken outside, and they were generally meant to be
pushed by an attendant rather than self-propelled. They were typically
made out of wood or wicker, so they were simultaneously heavy and
fragile.121
Some early wheelchairs did manage to capture significant public
attention, if not widespread use. Belgian inventor John Joseph
Merlin’s mechanical chair, released in the late eighteenth century, was
atypically self-propelled.122 Merlin heavily promoted his chair, and for
a century thereafter nearly all self-propelled chairs were known as
“Merlin chairs.”123 At the same time, inventors in the English spa
town of Bath produced chairs that could be used by people using the
city’s rejuvenating baths.124 These tricycle-like devices had large rear
wheels and a smaller front wheel that could be steered, but not propelled, by the rider. An attendant was required for mobility in a Bath
chair.125 These were chairs for the wealthy, but the cataclysm of a
major war would begin to alter wheelchair design.
Just as it had done for artificial limbs, the American Civil War
pushed innovation in wheelchair design. After the war, inventors
began to adapt technologies and materials from adjacent fields like
bicycle design into wheelchairs’ wheels and brakes.126 Several of these
inventors patented their creations, but most of them failed to find
much of a market.127
The biggest change during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was not, however, technological. Instead, it was the
increasing treatment of wheelchairs as medical devices, rather than
contrivances for the wealthy.128 Ironically, though, the medicalization
of the wheelchair did not result in its recognition as essential assistive
technology akin to crutches or protheses. Rather, in light of the prevailing rehabilitation model, where recovery from disability meant
doing things in the same way that nondisabled people did them,
“[w]heelchair use symbolized either the failure of medicine to find a
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Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 407.
GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 37.
See id.
See Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 408.
GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 37.
Id.
See U.S. Patent No. 2,095,411 (filed Feb. 11, 1936) (issued Oct. 12, 1937).
Id.
Id.
U.S. Patent No. 2,181,420 (filed Oct. 8, 1937) (issued Nov. 28, 1939).
U.S. Patent No. 2,486,015 (filed Oct. 1, 1945) (issued Oct. 25, 1949).
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This was the world of wheelchairs that Herbert Everest, a mining
engineer, entered when he became disabled in 1918.130 Everest had a
large wicker wheelchair that had to be strapped onto his car if he
wanted to travel with it.131 This was a challenging operation for
Everest, and it risked damaging the fragile device. If Everest couldn’t
get his wheelchair into his car, he couldn’t earn a living and support
his family.132 Accordingly, he did what the people at Toomey did—he
invented a solution to the problem.
Everest recalls that his wife discovered a folding wooden chair
that would fit in the car rather than having to be strapped onto it.133
From there, Everest contacted his neighbor, another engineer named
Harry Jennings, and together they produced a version of the folding
chair with tubular steel and welded joints.134 The chair resembled a
film director’s chair with small wheels.135 At this point, the Everest
and Jennings design was similar to the user innovations discussed in
Part II: a person with a disability and his family and friends adapted a
familiar product to the person’s needs. Everest and Jennings differed
from most of the innovators at Toomey in one important way: on
February 11, 1936, they filed for a U.S. patent.136 It was granted on
October 12 of the following year.137
Everest and Jennings formed a company, Everest & Jennings,
Inc., to produce and market their wheelchair, and over the next
decade they continued iterating its design. They added folding footrests in 1939,138 and several years later they enlarged the rear wheels
and shrunk the front ones, obtaining a patent on a design that became
the archetypal wheelchair for the remainder of the century.139
On the strength of its innovation, and supported by its patents,
E&J established wheelchairs as an essential assistive technology and
itself as the technology’s dominant provider. Benefiting from the
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increase in people with disabilities from the Second World War and
polio (President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was an E&J user140), the
company saw a massive jump in demand for its product.141 And this
need-based demand was further enhanced by government provision of
E&J chairs to disabled veterans142 and March of Dimes philanthropy
for polio survivors.143 Accordingly, by 1987, E&J had control of ninety
percent of the market in the United States.144
E&J’s wheelchair revolutionized the meaning of disability and
access for millions of people.145 People with mobility impairments
were no longer confined to their homes or institutions. Because the
chairs were lightweight and foldable, they could be packed in cars and
driven to work and to leisure.146 As the Paralyzed Veterans of
America put it, the E&J wheelchair “has signed the ‘declaration of
independence’ for many thousands of physically handicapped people
all over the world.”147 Or as E&J’s early advertising brochure
encouraged: “Work! Play! Go Anywhere! Without that invalid
look.”148 E&J’s wheelchair, in creating a newfound sense of independence among people with disabilities, also had the effect of aiding the
reconceptualization of public access.
The success of the E&J wheelchair also fundamentally shifted
ideas of rehabilitation for both people with disabilities and medical
specialists. Veterans had even less tolerance for the maladapted
crutches and protheses with which they were made to walk once they
could use wheelchairs that were much more efficient for mobility.149
Eventually, rehabilitation professionals began to catch on: “[W]hereas
140
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GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 38.
See Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 408.
142 See id. (noting the federal government’s provision of wheelchairs to veterans in the
aftermath of World War II).
143 See Daniel J. Wilson, Braces, Wheelchairs, and Iron Lungs: The Paralyzed Body and
the Machinery of Rehabilitation in the Polio Epidemics, 26 J. MED. HUMAN. 173, 173,
182–85 (2005).
144 DONALD S. SHEPARD & SARITA L. KAREN, THE MARKET FOR WHEELCHAIRS:
INNOVATIONS AND FEDERAL POLICY (HEALTH TECHNOLOGY CASE STUDY 30) (1984),
https://ota.fas.org/reports/8418.pdf; see also Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 408
(describing Everest & Jennings, Inc. (E&J) as holding a “near monopoly on the North
American prescription market by the 1960s”).
145 See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 38.
146 See id.
147 Woods & Watson, supra note 62, at 408 (citation omitted).
148 Mary Tremblay, Going Back to Civvy Street: A Historical Account of the Impact of
the Everest and Jennings Wheelchair for Canadian World War II Veterans with Spinal Cord
Injury, 11 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 149, 154 (1996).
149 See id. at 159 (“[A veteran said that] ‘[t]he emphasis then was on trying to make a
paraplegic walk. And that certainly delayed our rehabilitation for months and months. . . .
Then these [E&J] wheelchairs became available so they decided the answer was we were
going to be confined to a wheelchair and that’s it.’”).
141
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the objective was still to acquire normal capacities, this no longer
involved an alignment with ordinary physical and functional capacities
but the acquisition of new functional capacities pertaining specifically
to the use of the wheelchair.”150 The goal now, both for wheelchair
users and for specialists, was to “compensate for the loss of
mobility.”151
C. Anticompetitive Behavior, Innovation Brakes, and Backlash

10/08/2020 07:57:54

150 Myriam Winance, Anne Marcellini & Éric de Léséleuc, From Repair to
Enhancement: The Use of Technical Aids in the Field of Disability, in INQUIRING INTO
HUMAN ENHANCEMENT: INTERDISCIPLINARY AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 119, 121
(Simone Bateman et al. eds., 2015).
151 Id.
152 Robert Teitelman, De-Handicapping the Handicapped, FORBES, Sept. 24, 1984, at
196, 197.
153 RALF HOTCHKISS, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENT LIVING MOVEMENT
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 13 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Reg’l Oral History Office ed., 2010),
https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/hotchkiss_ralf.pdf.
154 Id. at 13–14.
155 See Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Intellectual Property Law and the Right to
Repair, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 100 (2019).
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The importance of E&J’s wheelchair innovations in the 1930s and
1940s cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, with the market power
provided by its patents and government contracts, E&J began to rest
on its laurels, producing no new innovation. And when its patents
began to expire, it engaged in anticompetitive behaviors to retain its
substantial profits. These activities hindered development of new
wheelchair technology for decades, and they soured some people with
disabilities on the use of patents as tools to encourage access innovations. Furthermore, other features of the market for wheelchairs—
including third-party payers and the prospect of tort liability—limited
innovation once new firms began to enter the market.
According to a story in Forbes magazine, “once Everest &
Jennings had its fundamental design down, time essentially stood
still—an old story in business. After all, why change a good thing?”152
E&J largely rested on the successful design that they had patented in
the 1930s and 1940s, and they produced few new innovations thereafter. In fact, Ralf Hotchkiss, a disability rights activist and wheelchair
innovator, suggests that E&J’s wheelchair design “actually started
sliding backwards.”153 E&J altered the design of the chair to make it
easier to manufacture, but in so doing, they produced a structurally
weaker chair that was more liable to break.154 Because E&J’s patents
gave it exclusive rights to make its wheelchairs, they also gave the firm
exclusive rights to repair them.155 More fragile wheelchairs meant
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more repairs. And more repairs, which could take weeks, meant that
users were encouraged to purchase a second wheelchair, also from
E&J, to avoid losing their independence.156
E&J’s patents began to expire in the early 1950s, and, according
to the standard incentives-access tradeoff at the heart of patent
policy,157 this should have meant that competitors could enter the
market and drive down the prices of wheelchairs. E&J, however, took
a number of steps to preclude competitor entry. First, E&J acquired
many of their potential competitors and shut them down.158 Not until
1983, following a sweeping antitrust investigation by the Department
of Justice, did E&J release an ultralight wheelchair.159 These “killer
acquisitions”—the sort that happen in a variety of other industries—
preserved E&J’s rent seeking ability.160
In addition, E&J was able to take advantage of third-party payers
for medical devices to structure the market in its favor.161 From the
1950s onward, the majority of wheelchairs were purchased by the federal government through the Veterans Administration (VA) or were
ultimately paid for by Medicaid and Medicare insurance.162 Each of
these bodies established specifications for the sorts of medical products that they would cover, and in each case the agencies developed
specifications that mapped closely onto the products that E&J produced.163 According to a 1984 report by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) of the U.S. Congress: “When VA standards were written in accord with E&J specifications, products were
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156 Fair and Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, S. 1874: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 444
(1978) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Deborah Kaplan, Director, Disability Rights
Center) (“[R]etailers and the manufacturer often take weeks to perform routine servicing
and repair work[,] . . . forcing consumers to purchase two wheelchairs . . . .”).
157 See supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
158 See HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 15 (describing E&J’s anticompetitive practices,
including taking “repressive . . . actions against small competitors in the U.S., crushing
them”); Brian Woods & Nick Watson, A Short History of Powered Wheelchairs, 15
ASSISTIVE TECH. 164, 168 (2003) (noting that E&J bought up rights to produce motorized
wheelchairs from a company that had gone out of business).
159 See HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 15–16 (detailing the investigation into E&J’s
practices); Teitelman, supra note 152, at 197.
160 Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions (Apr. 22,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3241707.
161 On insurers and innovation, see Eisenberg & Price, supra note 14, at 5 (“[P]ayers
have an incentive to reduce healthcare costs rather than to increase them, providing a
counterweight to the incentives of product-developing firms.”).
162 SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 4, 24. Medicaid and Medicare came into
existence in 1965. History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History (last visited May 27, 2020).
163 SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 27.
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Id.
Hearings, supra note 156, at 443–44 (statement of Deborah Kaplan).
166 HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 15; Jack Anderson & Les Whitten, Yes, Virginia,
There Is a Justice Department, DAILY STANDARD, Dec. 26, 1977, at 2.
167 Hearings, supra note 156, at 444 (statement of Deborah Kaplan).
168 HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 11–15.
169 See, e.g., Anderson & Whitten, supra note 166, at 2.
170 Id.
171 SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 3.
172 HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 16.
173 See Teitelman, supra note 152, at 197.
174 HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 16.
165

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 54 Side B

often evaluated on the basis of how closely they conformed to E&J’s
model.”164 Thus, to the extent that a competitor’s wheelchair diverged
from E&J’s models, it would have a more difficult time gaining
approval from the major purchasers and insurers in the federal
government.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, E&J established agreements with foreign manufacturers and retailers to prevent them from
exporting wheelchairs to the United States.165 When Ralf Hotchkiss
went to London to buy wheelchairs to bring back to the United States,
he was told by the local retailer that they could not sell to him.166
Accordingly, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, E&J was virtually the
only game in town when it came to the American market. The effect
on prices from lack of competition would be obvious to anyone: An
E&J wheelchair that sold for $161 in England cost $496 in the United
States.167 Americans with disabilities were getting poorer quality
wheelchairs at substantially higher cost because E&J turned the legitimate market power provided by its patents into illegitimate market
power via anticompetitive behavior.
By the middle of the 1970s, E&J’s behavior had become sufficiently notorious that disability rights activists began to complain.
Hotchkiss joined with other members of consumer advocate Ralph
Nader’s “Nader’s Raiders” to bring public and legal pressure on the
manufacturer.168 Journalists became interested in the story,169 and the
Department of Justice opened up an antitrust inquiry into E&J’s
activities.170 This led to a lawsuit that E&J settled in 1978.171 As
Hotchkiss describes it, “It was a classic consent decree, in which
Everest & Jennings swore they had never done anything wrong, and
promised never to do it again.”172
Following the antitrust settlement, E&J’s market share dropped
precipitously as competitors entered the market,173 consumer prices
fell, and quality improved.174 In many respects, however, wheelchair
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innovation did not speed up as rapidly as many had hoped.175
Although new entrants like Invacare and Sunrise Medical put pressure on E&J, they also began to buy up other smaller competitors.
“[I]n most cases [Invacare and Sunrise Medical] bought them up to
shut them down. . . . [U]nfortunately [it was] also in order to eliminate
innovation. To stop innovation in its tracks.”176 Seven years after the
settlement of the antitrust suit against E&J, the GAO report still
described the wheelchair market as “oligopolistic.”177
There are a variety of reasons why the wheelchair market may
have been less innovative and less competitive in the last quarter of
the twentieth century than some might otherwise imagine. Although
the size of the market was growing, there were various aspects of the
prevailing legal regimes and of the market structure that may have
curtailed innovation. I will now address the legal barrier to innovation, because it has gotten almost no attention in the literature, before
turning to the market barrier issue which has been discussed at greater
length.
1. Products Liability Law

10/08/2020 07:57:54

175 See id. (noting “slippage” in the rate of innovation after the initial post-lawsuit
boom).
176 Id.
177 SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 3.
178 Id. at 30.
179 See id. (noting that manufacturers’ fear of litigation “is greatest for an entirely new
product and less for the majority of innovations, which are modifications of existing
products”).
180 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 103 (quoting a wheelchair technician).
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When, in 1984, the GAO interviewed eleven wheelchair manufacturers to discuss innovation (and the lack of it) in the industry, several
of them cited fear of products liability litigation as the principal reason
for their failure to introduce new products.178 Wheelchairs are potentially dangerous to their users, and manufacturers claimed that introducing new products, without established safety records, could subject
them to massive liability should people get hurt. Accordingly, they
tended to stick to minor modifications of existing products rather than
introduce a completely novel product line.179 If they continued to
make wheelchairs following E&J’s established design, users would
have a difficult time arguing, if and when they got hurt, that the
product was fundamentally unsafe. Although it is hard to know
whether these manufacturers were being honest about their innovation decisions, their story was consistent with users’ experiences.
According to some, motorized wheelchairs only had two speeds: “slow
and very slow.”180 By this time, creating more dynamic motorized
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wheelchairs was increasingly feasible due to technological advances,
but manufacturers still did not supply products that users demanded.
Apparently, the choice to regulate wheelchairs had less to do with
technological limitations than it did with manufacturers’ desire to
avoid causing injuries for which they may have to pay.
Interestingly, this story runs counter to one of the major reasons
why U.S. courts adopted strict products liability during the second half
of the twentieth century.181 By preventing manufacturers from
escaping liability when their products were no more dangerous than
others on the market, strict liability was supposed to create incentives
to most efficiently reduce the costs of accidents.182 If products could
be made safer, then strict liability should have motivated innovation.183 To the extent that the story is different here, the answer likely
lies in the fact that wheelchair users were often not the actual purchasers of the technology. Because third-party payers decided which
products would be covered and which ones would not, wheelchair
manufacturers may not have felt compelled to search for innovations
that would increase safety while also improving performance.184 To
the extent that they did produce innovations, they tended to be
“tweaks” of decades-old designs rather than revolutionary
alternatives.185
2. Intermediary Payers

10/08/2020 07:57:54

181 See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (1990)
(“By making the actor strictly liable . . . we give him an incentive, missing in a negligence
regime, to experiment with methods of preventing accidents that involve . . . relocating,
changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity giving rise to the
accident.”); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980)
(comparing reductions in accident costs under negligence versus strict liability rules); Mark
A. Geistfeld, Products Liability 304–06 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series,
No. 09-19, 2009) (detailing the effects of tort liability on innovation).
182 Shavell, supra note 181, at 14–15.
183 There is mixed evidence for whether strict liability has been able to deliver on its
promise of improved innovation incentives. This literature is discussed in Geistfeld, supra
note 181, at 304–06.
184 See infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
185 See generally Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman,
The Nature of Sequential Innovation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing
tweaking versus pioneering innovations).
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An even larger distortion in the market for wheelchair innovation
arose from the existence of intermediaries—government and private
purchasers and insurers—who sit between manufacturers and users
and make decisions that affect which products are available to consumers. By 1984, the VA, Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance
companies accounted for almost ninety percent of the funding for
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SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 4.
See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
189 See SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 4 (“The extensive amount of third-party
reimbursement steers innovation to devices that can expect to receive such funds.”); id. at
41–42 (documenting eligibility of various designs for Veterans Administration (VA)
reimbursement).
190 See Wendy Netter Epstein, Payors, Data, and Nudges to Improve Care, 46 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 927, 927–28 (2018) (“Insurer financial motivations are likely to prompt denial of
reimbursement for profit maximization reasons and not the betterment of patient
health.”); Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, supra note 14, at 2012
(“[R]eimbursement decisions also give [Medicare and Medicaid] great power to influence
ex ante the kind of technologies that are developed.”).
191 SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 41.
192 Id. at 7.
193 Id. at 4.
187
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wheelchair purchases, and a variety of their activities distorted innovation incentives.186
For example, each of these parties employ specifications about
which wheelchairs they would cover and which they would not. E&J
was able to manipulate these specifications to capture more market
share.187 But even after E&J’s share was reduced, introducing an
innovation wheelchair design was risky.188 If one or more of the
payers refused to cover the new design, the manufacturer’s chances of
recouping its R&D costs were much lower.189 Scholars have recognized this problem in a variety of healthcare-related fields, and it
seems to have affected wheelchair innovation as well.190
Third-party payers’ specifications distorted innovation in a
number of other ways. For example, in order to receive coverage from
Medicare and Medicaid for at least some wheelchairs, people with disabilities needed to have a prescription.191 But according to the GAO,
physicians often wrote prescriptions for a “standard wheelchair,” so
the insured party only received reimbursement for one of the cheapest
models.192 Manufacturers would not make more innovative and thus
more expensive products if they did not believe that they would be
able to sell them. One particular distortion arose from the way in
which many third-party payers covered wheelchairs. Often when considering which wheelchairs are justifiable expenditures, the only costs
that payers contemplated, at the time of GAO’s study, were initial
purchase costs.193 Medicare, for example, might prefer Firm A’s chair
over Firm B’s chair because the former sells for one hundred dollars
less than the latter. The lower upfront price, though, could be based
on Firm A’s use of cheaper materials that would wear out more
quickly. But if Medicare does not cover repair costs, then it would not
factor them into its determination of which wheelchair is a better
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value. Thus, firms tended to compete on keeping initial purchase costs
low at the expense of long-term use and performance value.194 As the
GAO argued, “[t]he emphasis on price over performance in the reimbursement procedures for general manual wheelchairs has probably
discouraged innovation. As manufacturers have difficulty selling a
higher priced, higher quality, manual wheelchair, they probably have
little reason to produce one.”195
Ultimately, intermediaries in the wheelchair market seem to have
distorted innovation in a variety of ways. This was mostly the case
because the intermediaries’ preferences didn’t match up well with
users’ preferences. We’ve seen this phenomenon already when rehabilitation specialists tried to get disabled veterans to conform to their
ideas of recovery.196 Similarly, when manufacturers did not have to
worry about users’ preferences for speedier wheelchairs, they seem to
have avoided innovating designs that could combine performance
with safety.197 Here again, when disabled users of technology are prevented from choosing the products that they want and using them in
the ways that they see fit, the innovative process will be distorted.
***

195
196
197

See id. at 4, 27.
Id. at 4.
See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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The wheelchair, and in particular E&J’s wheelchair, was
inarguably the most important access technology of the twentieth century. Not only did it enable extraordinary gains in independence for
people with disabilities, but it also reshaped the medical profession’s
approach to rehabilitation and encouraged a new sense of political
empowerment for people with disabilities—a topic I turn to below. As
a matter of the law’s innovation policy, however, the story of the
wheelchair is much more complicated. It was sparked by user innovation, but its widespread commercialization was encouraged both by
patent rights on the supply side and by social welfare laws and philanthropy on the demand side. The market power these forces created
continued even after their disappearance, as E&J solidified its position by colluding with competitors and manipulating standards.
Finally, when federal antitrust action brought these practices to an
end, wheelchair innovation did not see the immediate growth that
might have been expected due to legal and market factors that inhibited the creation and dissemination of novel technology. Nonetheless,
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the modern wheelchair ushered in a new era of disability access that
led to the development of further tools for encouraging innovation.
IV
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AS DEMAND-SIDE INNOVATION
INCENTIVE

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 57 Side A

With the aid of their E&J wheelchairs, by the middle of the twentieth century people with disabilities could venture out of their homes
and hospitals into the world around them. These improvements in
access cannot and should not be understated. But wheelchair users
quickly recognized that, in many respects, access was illusory. They
repeatedly confronted barriers, including stairs, curbs, narrow doorways, and unusable bathrooms, that limited their ability to “live in the
world.”198 Increasingly, activists, designers, and scholars began to construct a new understanding of disability, one that focused not on physical or medical impairment but instead on the ways in which the built
environment limited access for people with disabilities.199
The same group of activists, designers, and scholars also engaged
in a large-scale project to literally reshape that environment. It began
in private homes and hospitals, but innovations in reconstructing the
environment soon spread to college campuses, driven by the insight
and passion of a cohort of people with disabilities and designers.
While these were important steps, activists saw that more would be
needed to encourage public and private buildings and transportation
systems to adopt technologies that would make them usable for
people with disabilities. Governments and private actors would have
to be compelled to recognize their interests.
From the late 1960s to the end of the century, activists with disabilities pushed for and received legal regulations, modeled on contemporary civil rights laws, that would encourage, if not always force, first
the federal government and then municipalities and private actors to
implement technologies that enabled people with disabilities to access
public spaces. In this respect, the antidiscrimination laws from 1968’s
Architectural Barriers Act (ABA)200 to 1990’s Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)201 operate as demand-forcing innovation
incentives. By threatening legal liability if regulated entities fail to
adopt accessible features, these laws increase willingness to pay for
198
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See generally tenBroek, supra note 15.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 96–101.
200 Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–57
(2018)).
201 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213
(2018)).
199
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A. Design Standards and the Social Model of Disability
There had been attempts, in the first half of the twentieth century
and earlier, to modify buildings to minimize stairs, but, with the
exception of hospitals and institutions, these efforts were largely confined to the private homes of wealthy people with disabilities.

10/08/2020 07:57:54

202 See Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for
Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1807 (2015) (“[Innovation] sticks
. . . may be especially useful in situations in which . . . market signals diverge in predictable
ways from what we desire as a social matter.”).
203 Pub L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–96 (2018)).
204 See supra Section II.B.

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 57 Side B

innovation.202 A municipal bus service that previously had low willingness to pay for accessible transport should be incentivized by antidiscrimination laws to adopt innovative measures in order to avoid legal
liability.
Several important themes emerge in the discussion that follows.
First, antidiscrimination law motivated innovations in accessible
design, but these innovations were not always in the form of products.
For example, many of the changes to streets and buildings used
simple, pre-existing devices like ramps. New, however, was the creation of systematic knowledge about the needs of people with disabilities and the motivation to distribute that knowledge to architects and
designers. Although the ADA did spur innovation in products like
accessible buses or wheelchair lifts, its principal effect was on the creation and dissemination of information.
Second, unlike the access innovations discussed above, which
were exclusively available to an individual user, many of the designs
motivated by antidiscrimination laws were aimed at the environmental level. These designs could be used by many people, often at
the same time, and often by nondisabled people. Relatedly, incentives
for environment-level innovations tended to produce more stable diffusion of technology. The ramps, curb cuts, and elevators that were
installed in response to the 1973 Rehabilitation Act203 may still be in
use, unlike the driver controls that emerged for WWII veterans but
largely disappeared thereafter.204
Finally, although antidiscrimination laws can increase demand for
access innovations, the purchasers of those innovations are often third
parties rather than people with disabilities themselves. Whenever
innovation purchasers are not the ultimate users, there are opportunities for distortions. In addition, when the costs of accessible design are
borne by non-users, those costs are especially salient, and often objectionable, to payors.
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GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 28.
Id. at 41–42.
207 See id. at 3 (“Today, [a student’s difficulty navigating campus on crutches] is
understood as a question of access. But in the 1950s . . . most people[ ] interpreted issues
like this as a kind of personal challenge. It was [the student’s] responsibility to ‘fit in.’”).
208 Id. at 55 (noting that the efforts led by Nugent and others “mark[ed] a profound shift
in the very conception of access”).
209 Id. at 71 (citation omitted); see also TIMOTHY J. NUGENT, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND
INDEPENDENT LIVING MOVEMENT ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 17, 74 (Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley, Reg’l Oral History Office ed., 2009), https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/
ucb/text/nugent_timothy.pdf.
210 GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 59 (“[U]ltimately, [Nugent] began to argue, lack of access
could be hunted down and tied to the minutiae of design. These he began to call
‘barriers.’”).
211 Id. at 58–59 (“Society has given the real range of bodies and abilities very little
thought. . . . Stairs, [Nugent] explained, are an architectural convenience based on
centuries of social convention, yet they are now so naturalized that we scarcely reflect on
them long enough to realize that they are an accommodation.”).
206
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Throughout the mid-1800s, the British city of Bath leveled off and
widened its streets to improve access to its bath houses and spas.205
And President Roosevelt modified both the White House and his
retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia to accommodate his wheelchairs.206
But to many nondisabled people and to designers, the prevalent attitude was that people with mobility impairments should either stay at
home or learn to adapt to the world they found.207 By the 1950s and
1960s, activists and designers at university campuses began challenging the idea that accessibility was only for special places or special
people.
Timothy Nugent was certainly not the first person to notice the
manifold ways in which the built environment of public and private
spaces created access barriers for people with mobility impairments,
but he became one of the most prominent early proponents of design
standards that would remedy these issues.208 Nugent was a professor
of health education and director of the Rehabilitation Education
Center at the University of Illinois from the 1940s to the 1980s, and he
worked to reengineer the campus at Urbana-Champaign to, in his
words, “[make] it possible for the talents and resources of millions of
physically handicapped individuals to be put to use for the betterment
of mankind.”209
Nugent was a designer, and he recognized—and named—the
architectural “barriers” that hindered access to the university.210 Principal among these were the innumerable curbs and steps that made
getting around campus and entering buildings all but impossible for
students using wheelchairs. Without thinking, centuries of architects
had been designing buildings and spaces that incorporated features
that were accessible to some people but inaccessible to others.211 In
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212 Id. at 75 (responding to a questioner at a conference who asked how he entered the
building, Nugent retorted: “‘Well, just a minute. How did you get in this building?’ . . . [The
questioner] said, ‘I climbed up the steps.’ [Nugent] said, ‘Oh, wouldn’t you have looked
like a jackass crawling up the face of that wall if someone hadn’t thought of those steps
first?’” (quoting NUGENT, supra note 209, at 138)).
213 Id. at 71–72. The university also purchased two buses with hydraulic lifts. Id. at 71.
214 See, e.g., ERNST MACH, THE SCIENCE OF MECHANICS: A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL
ACCOUNT OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 31 (Thomas J. McCormack trans., Open Court Publ’g Co.
6th ed. 1960) (1893).
215 GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 154.
216 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 63–64.
217 ANSI 117.1—1961: AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR MAKING
BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES ACCESSIBLE TO, AND USABLE BY, THE PHYSICALLY
HANDICAPPED § 5.3 (AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST. 1961); see also HAMRAIE, supra note 2,
at 73; WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 64.
218 HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 110; WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 64. But see id. at 65
(“The 1:12 rise specified for wheelchair ramps . . . was still steep, and required a certain
wheelchair skill to climb.”).
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Nugent’s view, features such as stairs, which made accessing upper
stories of buildings possible for some people but impossible for others,
were no more natural or any less “special” than other features that
could be used by more people.212
Nugent began working to retrofit as much of the UIUC campus
as possible to make it accessible to wheelchair users. These redesigns
primarily included the installation of ramps on buildings, including
rather elaborate ones to get to the second floor of a classroom
building.213 These were hardly revolutionary technologies in the sense
that one normally associates with the concept of innovation. The
inclined plane is one of the six traditional “simple machines,” and it
occurs in nature and has been used throughout human existence.214
Instead, Nugent’s innovation was to create a systematic body of
knowledge about wheelchairs users’ needs that would radically transform the lives of students on campus. Interestingly, Nugent reported
that many of the accommodations for people with disabilities were
also used and preferred by nondisabled people.215
Beyond demonstrating the means of designing accessible spaces,
Nugent led the development of standards that would enable architects
around the world to reproduce these designs.216 Working with
researchers at the VA and the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), Nugent’s team from UIUC worked with students with disabilities to measure the amount of space that wheelchair users required
for opening doors and making turns.217 They determined the appropriate incline for ramps to make them usable for people with upper
limb impairments that limited their strength.218 And they determined
the optimal dimensions of water fountains (30-36 inches from the
floor), bathroom stalls (3’ x 5’ with a 32” outward swinging door), and
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elevators (a complex measure of total area, door width, and button
height).219 All of these measurements were based on the “standard
model” wheelchair, which, at this time, would have certainly been an
E&J.220
In 1961, they compiled their findings and published them as the
official ANSI standards, number 117.1.221 ANSI 117.1 was a short
pamphlet that provided standards for “all buildings and facilities used
by the public.”222 At the time of its publication, it was not binding on
any architects or designers, but it helped to codify and communicate
the knowledge that Nugent and his colleagues had developed.223 The
standards helped architects envision the ways in which their choices
affected accessibility, and the document began to revolutionize architects’ design vocabularies.224 As with the simple ramps he installed on
buildings, Nugent’s guidelines were not the sort of product that is normally associated with innovation, and he would not have been able to
obtain patent protection had he wanted it.225 Nonetheless, their contribution to accessible design was immense.
While the work of Nugent and other designers showed that
spaces could be designed to make them accessible to wheelchair users
if institutions were willing, in most cases the parties that owned buildings and buses simply were not interested. The same was true for the
designers and architects who built them. Building owners and municipalities were not inclined to spend money retrofitting spaces for what
they saw as a tiny population of users.226 And to many design professionals, Nugent’s designs were ugly.227 Although Nugent and others

10/08/2020 07:57:54

ANSI 117.1—1961 §§ 5.6–5.9.
Id. § 3.1.
221 Id.
222 Id. § 1.1.1.
223 See HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 73, 86.
224 See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 68–69 (“[Nugent’s] specifications were seen as the
impartial, scientific, and definitive solution to the question of disability and environmental
change. They became a model for builders and architects.”); see also WILLIAMSON, supra
note 2, at 64–65.
225 The standards were subject to copyright protection with respect to the book in which
they were published, but the copyright likely would not extend to the measurements and
data that it reported. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
226 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 137–38 (describing popular pushback following
federal efforts to improve public buses by including wheelchair accessibility).
227 Joanne Milner, Dennis Urquhart & David Cox, Universal Design and Designer
Awareness: The Constraints of Architectural Education, INDEP. LIVING INST. (1991), https://
www.independentliving.org/cib/cibbudapest19.html (“A common view shared by many
architects is that access is a byword for ugly. They argue that it is a costly and unnecessary
220
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constraint, cluttering up clean pure spaces with hospital hardware, like grab-rails, stair/
chair lifts and ramps.”).
228 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 99 (noting that most of the Berkeley activists “had
received rehabilitation and social services that pushed strongly an idea of ‘overcoming’
disability”).
229 See id. at 45 (arguing that the forms of access developed by Rusk and Nugent
“reflected a clear stance that navigating and negotiating the inaccessible society was the
responsibility of the individual”).
230 See id. at 141. See generally id. at 96–128 (documenting protest efforts).
231 Samaha, supra note 21, at 1255.
232 HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 100 (quoting Iris Marion Young, Foreword to
DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY: EMBODYING DISABILITY THEORY, at xii (Mairian Corker &
Tom Shakespeare eds., 2002)).
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offered innovations that could make the environment more accessible,
the people with disabilities who most valued these changes were not in
a position to implement them. FDR could adapt the White House to
accommodate his wheelchair, but the average citizen had no means to
get the local post office or courthouse to do the same.
Things began to change in the 1960s and 1970s as groups of
people with disabilities, most prominently those at the University of
California Berkeley’s Center for Independent Living, began to adopt
the pervasive language of discrimination and civil rights to push for
laws that would require accessibility. First, these activists had to convince lawmakers and the public that “overcoming disability,” and the
lack of access that it entailed, was not primarily the responsibility of
people with disabilities.228 This belief—that people with disabilities
must adapt themselves to the world—was pervasive in the 1950s and
1960s, and even leading rehabilitation professionals like Rusk and
Nugent subscribed to some version of it.229 Protesters across the
country stopped traffic, attempted to board public buses, and held rallies to demonstrate that the problem of access was social and environmental rather than personal.230
Increasingly, these efforts had major effects. In general, they
helped establish the social model of disability. As Adam Samaha summarizes it, “the model moves causal responsibility for disadvantage
from physically and mentally impaired individuals to their architectural, social, and economic environment.”231 Or, as Iris Marion Young
has put it: “[M]oving on wheels is a disadvantage only in a world full
of stairs.”232 The fundamental idea behind the social model of disability is to clearly distinguish between an impairment, such as difficulty
walking, and a disability, the lack of access to a building with stairs. As
Jessica Roberts explains, a person “may not experience that condition
as disabling until she attempts to enter a building with a stairwell or a
narrow doorway. Thus, the impairment—difficulty walking—is dis-
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tinct from the disability—a lack of access.”233 Stairs, curbs, and the
design of bathrooms are the problem, not the bodies of people with
disabilities.
B. Disability Access Lawmaking: From the ABA to the ADA
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233 Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963,
1987 (2013).
234 See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 21, at 1269.
235 Winance, Marcellini & de Léséleuc, supra note 150, at 122 (“[I]nstead of adapting
themselves to that society, they asked society to change.”).
236 See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 24 (1996) (“Even before the passage of the
ADA, some employers found such expenditures to be profitable and hired the
disabled . . . .”).
237 Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 5.
238 James S. Jeffers, Barrier-Free Design: A Legislative Response, in BARRIER-FREE
ENVIRONMENTS 44, 46 (Michael J. Bednar ed., 1977).
239 Id. at 45–46.
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From the idea that environmental features are responsible for
disability and lack of access, many activists concluded that the environment must be fixed.234 No longer should people with disabilities
have to adapt to their environments; instead, their environments
should have to adapt to them.235 The challenge, though, was to have
governments, transportation authorities, and private businesses alter
their spaces to make them accessible. In some cases, these parties
might be willing to eliminate barriers to access because doing so was
in their economic self-interest.236 Others might have done so out of a
sense of fairness to people with disabilities. But in many cases, these
parties could be expected to balk at the costs of changing environments or purchasing different tools. Building ramps, modifying bathrooms, and buying accessible buses all cost money, and the groups
who owned and operated public facilities might determine that the
expenditures were not worth it. Accordingly, activists turned to legislation—in particular, legislation couched in the terms of antidiscrimination law—to encourage the creation of accessible
environments.237
The legal landscape developed rapidly beginning in the middle of
the 1960s, first with state legislation that adopted variations on
Nugent’s ANSI 117.1 standards into building codes.238 In response to
advocacy by the National Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children
and Adults, the University of Illinois, and the President’s Committee
on Employment of the Handicapped, more than half of the states had
adopted some form of accessible building codes by 1965.239 That year
saw the beginning of major federal legislation with the passage of the
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Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1965,240 creating the
National Commission on Architectural Barriers to the Rehabilitation
of the Handicapped.241 Among the Commission’s responsibilities was
studying the uptake (or lack thereof) of barrier-free architecture.242 It
released a report, Design for All Americans,243 that detailed challenges to accessible design, including failure to fully adopt ANSI standards into building codes, leading to insufficient attention by
architects who were often unaware of the standards.244 In addition,
the ANSI standards did not refer to accessible transportation.245
The Commission’s findings encouraged further legislative efforts,
in particular the passage of the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) of
1968.246 The ABA began the process of incorporating ANSI standards
into legislation, requiring compliance with the standards for buildings
owned or leased by the federal government.247 The law did not
include any explicit enforcement provisions, and, unsurprisingly, compliance was far from perfect.248 In response to the statute’s passage,
the General Services Administration, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, and the Department of Defense began issuing
regulations for the use of federal funds on building design.249 The
ABA did not apply, however, to preexisting buildings, federally
financed transportation systems, state governments or local municipalities, or private parties.250
Congress continued to develop a more robust approach to disability access, passing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973251 (the Act) and
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240 Pub. L. No. 89-333, 79 Stat. 1282, repealed by Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93112, 87 Stat. 355.
241 Jeffers, supra note 238, at 46.
242 Id.
243 NAT’L COMM’N ON ARCHITECTURAL BARRIERS TO REHAB. OF THE HANDICAPPED,
DESIGN FOR ALL AMERICANS (1967).
244 Jeffers, supra note 238, at 46.
245 Id.
246 Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–57
(2012)).
247 RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING
FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 29–30 (2d ed. 2001); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples,
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social
Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1378 (1993).
248 SCOTCH, supra note 247, at 31; Drimmer, supra note 247, at 1378 & n.151.
249 Jeffers, supra note 238, at 48.
250 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 115 (noting the law covered federal buildings but
not “neighboring buildings or transportation networks”); Drimmer, supra note 247, at
1377–78, 1377 n.150 (arguing the Architectural Barriers Act mandate for new federal
buildings was narrow, especially compared to the prohibitions on and acknowledgement of
discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
251 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–96 (2018)).
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significantly reorienting federal disability law.252 Several features of
the Act are especially worthy of notice. First, the Act created the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board and
tasked it with ensuring compliance with the ABA.253 Although the
Board was small, underfunded, and limited to responding to complaints brought to it, the Board was able to exert pressure on federal
building projects to increase compliance with ANSI 117.1 standards.254 Next, the Act expanded the scope of regulated parties to
include all those receiving federal funds, including universities, federal
contractors, and municipal transportation programs, by virtue of
Section 504’s broad prohibition on discrimination by “any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”255
Perhaps most importantly, Section 504 explicitly adopted the language of antidiscrimination law, connecting access for people with disabilities to the other major civil rights movements of the era.256 The
section (as currently codified) reads:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.257
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252 See SCOTCH, supra note 247, at 8–11 (listing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as one of
the legislative achievements responsible for changing the view that people with disabilities
were incapable of being self-sufficient).
253 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 502, 87 Stat. 355, 391–93 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2018)).
254 See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 143–44.
255 See generally Rehabilitation Act § 504, 87 Stat. at 394 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018)).
256 Section 504 was not included in the initial draft of the bill. SCOTCH, supra note 217,
at 49.
257 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
258 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
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This language explicitly echoes that of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.258 Yet while disability rights were placed on par with the
civil rights claims of Black people and women, they were also placed
on a different, and stronger, footing. Whereas as Title VII prohibited
racial discrimination by means of a negative commandment (“Thou
shalt not . . .”), the Rehabilitation Act was read to impose affirmative
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Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 236, at 9, 14.
See SCOTCH, supra note 247, at 60–61.
261 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 131.
262 See infra notes 312–16.
263 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 131–32.
264 Id. at 132.
265 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or
Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676, 22,681 (May 4, 1977);
SCOTCH, supra note 247, at 117.
266 There were, unsurprisingly, many lamentations about the underenforcement of
Section 504. See, e.g., Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After Ten
Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 848.
267 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101–213 (2018)).
268 Id. § 101(5)(A) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)).
269 Id. § 201(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)).
270 Id. § 301(7) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)).
271 See id. §§ 102, 202, 302 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182).
260
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obligations on regulated parties to take steps to eliminate access
barriers.259
Over the course of the 1970s, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) began drafting and implementing regulations for the Rehabilitation Act.260 When the initial draft was published in 1975, it demanded substantial overhauls of existing buildings
with the goal of total accessibility.261 Regulated entities fought back,
arguing that the standards were unnecessarily costly for such a small
group of individuals.262 When it looked like HEW was backsliding
into compromises, activists from Berkeley’s Center for Independent
Living and other activists staged a twenty-six-day protest at HEW’s
building in San Francisco.263 Ultimately, HEW Secretary Joseph
Califano agreed to approve the regulations without the compromises.264 The regulations required that all new facilities be barrierfree, while existing facilities requiring structural changes had three
years to become compliant.265 For the first time, regulated entities
would be responsible for spending money on accessibility in order to
comply with federal law.266
Federal disability law leapt forward with the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,267 which built on the antidiscrimination framework established by the Rehabilitation Act and
expanded it to an even larger range of parties. The list of covered
entities under the ADA included employers with fifteen or more
employees,268 public entities like local school systems,269 and places of
public accommodation, including stores, hotels, restaurants, and a
host of other privately run businesses that are held open to the
public.270 In each case, the covered entity is prohibited from discriminating against people with disabilities,271 and, as with the
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272 See Emens, supra note 20, at 877 (“Unlike Title VII, the ADA defines discrimination
in terms of accommodation.”).
273 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
274 See, e.g., Emens, supra note 20, at 857 & n.40.
275 See id. at 878.
276 See id. at 869 (describing various types of “reasonable accommodations” discussed in
court cases).
277 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
278 Id. §§ 12131–65; Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1824 (2005).
279 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
280 Id. §§ 12161, 12162, 12164.
281 Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1824.
282 Id.
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Rehabilitation Act, the ADA imposes affirmative duties on these entities to make reasonable accommodations to provide access.272
Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating
against people with disabilities, including by failing to make reasonable accommodations that would enable them to perform the job.273
The nature of the necessary accommodations varies considerably and
can include changes to work schedules or assignment to different
jobs.274 It can also mean that the employer is responsible for adapting
the workplace environment to make it usable for the employee who
has a disability.275 This might include lowering countertops, installing
lifts, or otherwise altering the physical plant of the workplace.276 Both
private individuals and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission have the power to enforce Title I of the ADA via
litigation.277
Although Title I has received the most attention in the courts and
from scholars, Titles II and III are also important pieces of the ADA’s
approach to access. Title II, which was patterned after Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, prohibits discrimination by public entities,
including state and local government services.278 It goes beyond the
prior law by regulating all public entities, whether or not they receive
federal funding.279 Part B of Title II applies to access to public transportation, and it grants the federal Department of Transportation
rulemaking authority to implement the ADA.280 Individuals or the
Department of Justice may sue to enforce Title II.281 Individuals may
receive damages for intentional discrimination but not for disparate
impact discrimination, and they can obtain attorneys’ fees but not
punitive damages.282
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation, requiring them to make reasonable modifications of
their physical establishments, as well as any policies, practices, or procedures that would not fundamentally alter the nature of their goods,
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services, or facilities.283 Facilities constructed to be occupied after
January 26, 1993 must comply with the ADA’s Accessibility
Guidelines,284 which model the updated ANSI 117.1 standards first
drafted by Timothy Nugent in the 1960s.285 This requires accessible
ramps, lifts, and bathrooms, among a variety of other technologies.286
Facilities that predate the ADA are obliged to remove architectural
barriers to the extent that doing so is “readily achievable,” but if older
buildings are altered after the ADA, they must be accessible to the
“maximum extent feasible.”287 Interestingly, the Internal Revenue
Service provides a tax incentive to small businesses to ease the burden
of compliance.288 Unlike the prior titles, Title III does not provide
individuals with a private damages remedy. While individuals can seek
injunctive relief on their own behalf, damages are only available if the
Attorney General intervenes and so requests.289
Over the course of three decades, federal legislation produced a
sweeping reorganization of disability policy focused on antidiscrimination law, although social welfare law has remained important.290 From
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 onward, federal disability law did not
just prohibit discrimination in a narrow sense (e.g., refusal to hire
people with disabilities), but it also imposed affirmative obligations on
regulated parties to undo some of the ways in which environmental
structures were inaccessible. These laws encouraged the further dissemination of information about accessibility, pushing architects and
designers to integrate new standards into their work. The next Section
considers the ways in which the accommodation mandate succeeded
and failed in its goal of promoting disabled access.

While scholars have debated the extent to which the accommodation requirements in federal disability law significantly distinguish dis283
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42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A); Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1825.
Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1847.
285 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 244 n.4.
286 U.S. ARCHITECTURAL & TRANSP. BARRIERS COMPLIANCE BD. (ACCESS BD.),
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA): ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR BUILDINGS
AND FACILITIES §§ 4.8, 4.11, 4.23 (2003), https://www.access-board.gov/attachments/article/
1350/adaag.pdf.
287 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12183(a)(2).
288 See Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the
Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1124 (2006).
289 Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1825.
290 See Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 4–5 (“[A]ctivists ‘on the ground’ have increasingly
understood the importance of the social welfare system to achieving the goals of the
disability rights movement.”).
284
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C. The Successes and Failures of Antidiscrimination Innovation
Incentives
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291 See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 862–63 (2004) (examining the extent to
which the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement is not foreign to established
antidiscrimination law).
292 But see Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 236, at 24 (“Even before passage of the
ADA, some employers found such expenditures to be profitable and hired the
disabled . . . .”).
293 For a discussion of the likely accuracy of parties’ estimates of the costs and benefits
of compliance, see Helen A. Schartz, D.J. Hendricks & Peter Blanck, Workplace
Accommodations: Evidence Based Outcomes, 27 WORK 345, 347 (2006) (“Despite
generally positive findings on the low cost and substantial benefits of accommodations,
employers continue to report unsubstantiated concerns about types and costs of workplace
accommodations.”).
294 See Berven & Blanck, supra note 16, at 79–80 (discussing the possibility of “induced
innovation” in the disability context).
295 See id.
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ability from other forms of antidiscrimination law,291 for our purposes,
requiring regulated parties to adopt and pay for barrier-free access
operates as a demand-side innovation incentive. Without the requirement, for example, a local transit authority might not be willing to pay
to modify or replace its fleet of buses to make them accessible to
wheelchair users.292 After the passage of the Rehabilitation Act,
though, the transit authority faces potential legal liability for its failure
to do so. In theory, it will now be willing to pay any amount of money
less than the expected liability that it faces in order to comply with the
law. Thus, relative to the period before the Rehabilitation Act’s passage, demand for disabled access is significantly greater.
Imagine, for example, that a restaurant operated in a building
that is inaccessible to patrons using wheelchairs. The restaurant estimates that making the building accessible would cost one thousand
dollars, but that it would only generate an additional five hundred dollars in revenue.293 Prior to the ADA, the restaurant would be unlikely
to retrofit its building. After the ADA, however, the threat of legal
liability could provide sufficient incentive for the restaurant to make
the renovations. The restaurant might comply by altering its building
in light of the regulations on national accessibility standards, or it
might purchase new technology like a wheelchair lift that accomplishes the same goal.294
Moreover, regulated parties will want to comply with the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA in order to avoid liability, but given
their limited budgets, they will want to do so as cheaply and efficiently
as possible. This presents an opportunity for innovation.295 In the
post-act period, regulated parties demand more accessible technology,
and firms will compete to supply it. Those firms that can help regulated parties meet their obligations at the lowest cost will tend to win a
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296 See Emens, supra note 20, at 846–47 (describing accommodations as existing along a
spectrum of third-party benefits); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of
Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 88 (2003) (contrasting types of
accommodations that alter a physical space—which might also be used by other
employees—with accommodations that alter the way in which a particular employee
performs her job).
297 See Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1812 (“[T]he legal scholarship focused on Title I
of the ADA views the ADA as disappointing. . . . The claim is often supported with
employment statistics.”).
298 Satz, supra note 18, at 516.
299 See Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1847–48 (noting that the Accessibility Guidelines
“provide an element of clarity that is missing elsewhere in Title III,” which “gives courts
less room to impose a high-level access/content distinction to defeat accessibility”).
300 Stein, supra note 296, at 89 n.49.
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larger share of the market. We can expect to see firms invest in
research that will lead to newer, cheaper solutions to disabled access.
Returning to the example above, because firms know that restaurants
will now demand technologies that improve the accessibility of their
buildings, firms will compete to supply them. These innovations could
drive down the cost of adapting the building. In this manner, federal
disability law’s antidiscrimination rules look like an innovation
incentive.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that many accessibility innovations that are encouraged by federal disability policy operate at the
environment level rather than the individual level.296 Whereas a
wheelchair can only be used by a single person, a ramp can be used by
many people. The same is true of curb cuts, accessible public buses,
and the myriad other ways in which the environment is reshaped in
order to comply with accessibility guidelines. In many cases, the innovations spurred by disability laws are relatively permanent and can be
used by many people for many years. Of course, all of that is in
theory. Now consider how it works in practice.
While federal disability laws have not generated all of the benefits that their proponents have desired, especially with respect to
employment outcomes for people with disabilities,297 some areas of
federal policy have had a substantial effect on access. Although
change has been incremental, the aspects of the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA that focused on building codes for new construction
have undeniably resulted in more governmental and privately owned
spaces that are wheelchair accessible.298 In large part this has to do
with the relatively clear standards established by ANSI 117.1 and the
ADA Accessibility Guidelines.299 Moreover, many of the technologies
involved, such as curb cuts and wheelchair ramps, are simple and inexpensive. While many spaces do not fully comply with the accessibility
guidelines,300 many more buildings are now substantially more acces-
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sible than they were in the 1950s and more than they would have been
in the absence of legislation.301
In addition to incentivizing the creation and distribution of information about accessible design, antidiscrimination laws have also
influenced the creation of new products that enable compliance. A
1998 study by Heidi M. Berven and Peter D. Blanck found that
growth in patents for assistive technologies outpaced overall growth in
patenting between 1975 and 1995, including 125 patents that explicitly
referenced the ADA.302 My most recent search of Google’s patent
database yields over seven hundred patents that reference the
ADA.303 These include inventions for pedestrian walkways,304 a standalone restroom,305 and an amusement park ride designed for people
with disabilities.306 There have also been many patents on chair lifts
for swimming pools.307 It is impossible to say that none of these inventions would have come about without the ADA, but it seems likely
that inventors were responding to the sizable market for accessible
design.308
Importantly, the benefits created by federal disability policy do
not just flow to people with disabilities. As Elizabeth Emens has documented, many accessible designs create substantial positive externalities for nondisabled people.309 This is especially true when the designs
are permanent fixtures of the environment.310 It is not just people in
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301 See Satz, supra note 18, at 516 (providing examples of the positive effects of the
ADA); see also Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1832 & n.118. Some evidence suggests that
the tax credit for small businesses has been less successful than might have been thought.
See Seto & Buhai, supra note 288, at 1126.
302 Berven & Blanck, supra note 16, at 60, 62–64.
303 Patents for Search Mentioning ADA, GOOGLE PATENTS, https://patents.google.com
(enter “(“americans with disabilities act”) status:GRANT” into search bar).
304 U.S. Patent No. 8,544,222 (issued Oct. 1, 2013).
305 U.S. Patent No. 5,682,622 (issued Nov. 4, 1997).
306 U.S. Patent No. 8,079,916 (issued Dec. 20, 2011).
307 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,646,119 (issued Feb. 11, 2014) (and patents cited therein).
308 To be clear, counting patents is not an especially strong proxy for innovation,
because it can be both underinclusive and overinclusive. Pierre Desrochers, On the Abuse
of Patents as Economic Indicators, 1 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 51, 52 (1998) (“[T]aken as a
whole, what comes out of a patent office is at best representative of the technological
potential of a given number of innovations, but certainly not of their technological
actuality.”). Lots of innovation occurs that is either unpatentable or for which inventors
choose not to seek patents. The stories above about user innovation demonstrate this
point. In addition, some of the “inventions” that receive patents may not represent
meaningful innovation that actually advances science or satisfies a market demand.
Despite these limitations, I include the above data as a suggestive proxy for innovation.
309 Emens, supra note 20, at 841 (“[T]he simple request for an accommodation by a
disabled person often benefits other people.”).
310 See id. at 846–47 (describing how generalizability, durability, and visibility increase
third-party benefits of accommodations).
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wheelchairs who benefit from wheelchair ramps, elevators, and curb
cuts; parents pushing strollers, delivery people with hand trucks, and
anyone for whom climbing stairs may present a challenge is better off.
Moreover, by improving employment opportunities for people with
disabilities, accessible designs contribute to a larger workforce with a
more robust tax base and fewer people in need of governmental support. Accordingly, the spillover benefits to nondisabled people must
be included when estimating the benefits that accrue from antidiscrimination law.311
But even these successes did not come without contestation. The
accommodation requirements of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
create benefits for people with disabilities (and others), but they do so
by imposing costs on (typically nondisabled) parties, such as municipalities and private landowners.312 To some, the added costs seem economically unjustified.313 If businesses will not gain enough revenue to
offset the costs of accommodation, then forcing them to accommodate
is an inefficient use of resources, absent government subsidies.314 This
is especially true for smaller businesses.315 Others view regulatory
demands that they build differently or alter aspects of their private
property as violations of their autonomy as property owners.316 Similar complaints were heard from designers themselves, who often
objected to accessible design as mandating ugly and cluttered
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311 See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (2007) (exploring the positive impact of spillovers in intellectual property).
312 See Emens, supra note 20, at 880 (“[O]nly people who consider themselves to have
disabilities are likely to see this statute as having been enacted for them. For everyone else,
the statute is either irrelevant or a potential cost to them, as employers or as coworkers to
whom costs may be shifted.”).
313 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 137–38 (describing backlash against accessible
public transportation after the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued
Section 504 regulations); Mark A. Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp to Serfdom: The
Americans with Disabilities Act, Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
495, 506 (1995) (arguing that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement sets an
inefficient price floor resulting in fewer jobs); Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1818 (“Some
commentators have suggested that the ‘accommodation mandate’ is economically
flawed.”).
314 See STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 230 (1989) (“The big gripe of the regulated clients was that
the federal government neither helped fund accommodations nor allowed compliance
timetables that would spread costs over a long period of time.”).
315 GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 158.
316 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 4 (“From the start, conversations about access
touched a sensitive nerve in American political discourse—namely, the bias against
collectivism and shared resources, rather than private property and individual economic
power.”); Langdon Winner, Is There a Right to Shape Technology?, 10 ARGUMENTOS DE
RAZÓN TÉCNICA 199, 210 (2007) (Spain) (describing the conflict between technological
development and a strong property right).
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design.317 Despite these complaints, the built environment in the
United States has become substantially more accessible over the past
half century.
Other areas of federal disability policy have been far less successful in improving accessibility. Employment of people with disabilities is a major example and one explored at length in other work.318
Under Title I’s reasonable accommodation mandate, the rules about
who is covered and what accommodations are reasonable are far less
clear than the guidelines provided by ANSI 117.1 and the ADA
Accessibility Guidelines.319 And certainly some attempts at creating
accessible spaces have failed in disastrous ways.320 These failures can
often be attributed to the way in which federal disability law makes
nondisabled parties the purchasers of designs for people with disabilities.321 As with the wheelchairs and intermediaries discussed above,
when people with disabilities do not get to choose which designs and
products they interact with, innovation incentives will often be
distorted.322
In addition, federal disability policy has generally operated at the
environmental level, focusing on creating accessible physical spaces,
but it has done much less for individual-level products that might
diminish the effects of impairment.323 In Title I employment cases, the
ADA may create incentives for firms to invest in products that enable
their employees with disabilities to work, and some scholars have
found that there are some innovations that are explicitly responsive to
317
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GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 158; RAYMOND LIFCHEZ & BARBARA WINSLOW, DESIGN
INDEPENDENT LIVING: THE ENVIRONMENT AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE 150
(1979).
318 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment
Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915 (2001)
(discussing the varied effects of the ADA on employment); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage
and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693
(2000); Waterstone, supra note 278, at 1812–13 (describing studies of employment statistics
for people with disabilities).
319 See, e.g., Jennifer Bennett Shinall, What Happens When the Definition of Disability
Changes? The Case of Obesity, 5 IZA J. LAB. ECON. 1, 2 (2016), https://
izajole.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40172-016-0041-0.
320 See, e.g., Paul Richoux, Five Ridiculously Bad Attempts at Wheelchair Ramps,
BESPOKEN (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.bespoken.me/forum/topics/5-ridiculously-badattempts-at-wheelchair-ramps.
321 Given the high percentage of the population that has a disability, not all of the nonuser purchasers will be nondisabled people. But they often will not have the same disability
as those for whom they are making purchasing decisions.
322 See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
323 See, e.g., HAMRAIE, supra note 2, at 212 (noting the ADA Accessibility Guidelines
did close to nothing for consumer product markets).
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the ADA’s demands.324 By and large, however, federal disability laws
leave the creation and distribution of accessibility products to the private market. This is also true of the other innovation incentives that
the federal government provides in the context of healthcare.325
***
Although it has not provided everything that activists desire, federal disability policy’s demand-side incentive has transformed the
American landscape. Entities that would not have adopted accessible
designs in the absence of legal regulation were spurred to do so by the
threat of legal liability. The scope of innovations for disabled access to
the built environment varies considerably. Some, like ramps and curb
cuts, would hardly be considered innovations at all. Others, like
wheelchair lifts and new interior designs, utilize the most advanced
technology. Yet focusing on manufactured products and technologies
misses a large part of the picture. The standards that Nugent and his
followers produced about the needs of people with disabilities are
hugely valuable new information that may not have been disseminated as widely or as rapidly without the incentives created by antidiscrimination laws.
LESSONS

FOR

V
DISABILITY INNOVATION INCENTIVES
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324 See Berven & Blanck, supra note 16, at 18 (describing findings of study on the
ADA’s economic stimulus effect on the assistive technology market).
325 Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, supra note 14, at 2005 n.65 (“By contrast,
there are far fewer special innovation incentives for companies seeking to make medical
devices or diagnostics.”).
326 To the extent that policymakers apply some version of cost-benefit analysis to
accessibility innovation laws, they should use the procedures outlined in John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013). Well-being analysis is especially valuable in the
context of disability, because evaluating the effects of disability merely by asking people
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid disabilities will produce systematic
distortions. See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007) (arguing that damages to
compensate for loss of enjoyment in life should not be awarded for disability); John
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008) (suggesting that time for
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From this history, it is possible to draw some lessons about innovation policy both for access for people with disabilities and more generally. The first lesson to be drawn from this context is that innovation
policy is never easy or straightforward. Policymakers face a range of
options for incentivizing innovations, and each option will have its
own costs and benefits.326 Moreover, the options may interact with
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adaptation to injuries may increase plaintiffs’ willingness to settle civil lawsuits, reducing
the costs of lengthy litigation processes).
327 See Samaha, supra note 21, at 1306 (“Once we move beyond the admittedly
formidable question of normative objective, the institutional issues begin to crystallize.”).
328 See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text.
329 See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Section III.C.2 (discussing
government health insurance influence on wheelchair innovation).
330 See supra Section III.C.1 (discussing products liability law).
331 See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 260–66 and accompanying text.
333 See supra Part IV.
334 See supra Section II.C; see also supra Part III.
335 I focus particularly on the questions of “who benefits” and “who pays.” Hemel and
Ouellette note that innovation policy levers may also be analyzed from the perspectives of
“when the reward will be provided” and “who decides.” Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4,
at 307–08. I drop these questions from the analysis for simplicity.
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others, producing outputs that are unforeseeable and undesirable. As
noted in the introduction, this Article makes no normative assertions
about the right amount of innovation for accessibility. It takes as given
that some amount of innovation is valuable, and it offers a comparative analysis of the various means for producing that innovation.327
The range of legal regimes that have influenced the pace and
direction of design for disability access is enormous. The expected
players are all here: intellectual property law, grants, and prizes.328
But other fields that are not typically associated with innovation also
show up, including social welfare law,329 tort law,330 health law,331
administrative law,332 and, perhaps most importantly, antidiscrimination law.333 Finally, many of the innovations that affected access for
people with disabilities were made by innovators who were entirely
indifferent to innovation law. The user innovators at Toomey, and
even the Everests and Jennings, were not motivated by legal incentives but rather by the recognition of a basic personal need that
demanded filling.334 It would be unwise to ignore innovators who
create without regard to the law.
Innovations can be beneficial, but they are also costly to produce.
Each of the different innovation incentives affects who bears the costs
and who obtains the benefits of innovation. Thus, the first Section of
this Part addresses which parties bear the costs and benefits of the
different innovation incentives discussed in this paper: intellectual
property, user innovation, social welfare laws, and antidiscrimination
laws.335 In doing so, it is particularly helpful to consider the role of
enforcement costs, the salience of costs and benefits, and the possible
spillover benefits that different regimes produce.
Next, this Part considers the various ways in which different legal
regimes can distort innovation incentives. Some of the distortions
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caused by innovation regimes have been thoroughly discussed in the
prior literature, but this study adds new insights to this issue.336 In
particular, I focus on the distortions that arise when the purchasers of
innovations are not their ultimate consumers.
A. Who Benefits and Who Pays?
1. Intellectual Property Law

10/08/2020 07:57:54

336 See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer Nudge, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 593
(2018) (discussing how to structure insurance to disincentivize unnecessary care); Hemel &
Ouellette, supra note 4, at 340 (discussing optimism bias and risk aversion); Kapczynski &
Syed, supra note 24, at 1942–50 (discussing two kinds of ideal-type distortion).
337 Although this Article is about accessible design, design patents have not played a
substantial role in this area. For a discussion of the distinction between design and utility
patents, see Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 33.
338 See supra note 34.
339 See Emens, supra note 20, at 846–47, 850–59.
340 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
341 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 294–96 (discussing the economic rationale
behind patent law).
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The obvious place to begin analyzing innovation incentives is
with the principal mechanism the federal government uses to spur
innovation—intellectual property law and, in particular, utility patents.337 Patents grant inventors exclusive rights to make, use, and sell
their inventions for a twenty-year period after which the invention
enters the public domain and is free for all.338 The standard economic
account of patent protection suggests that this exclusivity is an important incentive to encourage creators to invest in costly R&D and, once
their inventions have been made, to share them with the public.
As in all of the regimes discussed, users are the chief beneficiaries
of the innovations created in response to these incentives. When an
inventor creates and patents a new product—for example, a new
steering system for a motorized wheelchair—the products’ users are
made better off. To the extent that patented innovations for disabled
access may be narrowly tailored to a specific need, they are likely to
be most beneficial to people with disabilities themselves. It is possible,
however, that nondisabled people may obtain various positive externalities because either the invention turns out to be useful for them as
well or the invention unlocks a stream of research that produces other
products that will be valuable for nondisabled users.339
The other main beneficiaries of the patent regime are the inventors and owners of patent rights. As E&J’s wheelchair patents attest,
owning the exclusive right to make a desirable product can allow the
owner to charge prices far in excess of the marginal cost of producing
the goods.340 This is, of course, the whole point of the regime.341 Ide-
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342 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 311, at 292 (explaining how spillovers allow
value to “accrue to outsiders who tinker with or repurpose” inventions).
343 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 371 (“[P]atent rewards—unlike grants,
credits, and prizes—are ‘off-budget.’” (quoting William M. Sage, Commentary, Funding
Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology, 82
VA. L. REV. 1737, 1750 (1996))).
344 Id. at 312.
345 Id. (“We can think of the higher price of patented products as a ‘shadow’ tax and the
patent system as a ‘shadow’ government expenditure . . . .”).
346 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 294–96.
347 See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 982 (2012) (describing the short-term
inefficiencies resulting from placing a positive price on intellectual property).
348 INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 30, at 36; Kapczynski, supra note 347.
349 See Jennifer L. Wolff, Emily M. Agree & Judith D. Kasper, Wheelchairs, Walkers,
and Canes: What Does Medicare Pay for and Who Benefits?, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1140 (2005)
(results of a study examining acquisition of mobility devices through Medicare).
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ally, the rents that patent owners can charge would be optimally tailored to allow them to recoup their R&D investments and no more,
but the patent system does not work that way, and owners can often
obtain revenues far in excess of their costs.342
The patent system tends to look costless, at least from the government’s perspective.343 Other than the administrative costs of running
the system, the government does not have to invest substantial money
for patents, unlike grants, prizes, and tax incentives.344 But patents do
impose substantial costs, primarily in the form of higher prices for
consumers—and their insurance companies.345 Again, the inventor’s
ability to charge more than the marginal cost of production is the way
the patent system creates an incentive for innovation.346 Those higher
costs are borne by those who pay for the protected products, whether
they are users who are disabled, insurance companies, the state, or
third parties installing accessible technology on their property. In all
of these contexts, the existence of patent protection shifts consumer
surplus to producer surplus, making producers richer at the expense of
purchasers.
Moreover, some would-be consumers cannot afford products at
the prices generated by patent law’s exclusive rights.347 They would
have been willing to buy a sports wheelchair at a competitive price
based on the costs of production, but they will not or cannot buy one
at the monopoly price. These consumers are a deadweight loss, and
they represent another cost of the patent system.348 Medicaid,
Medicare, and private insurance companies cover some of the costs of
purchasing accessible technology for people with disabilities, but, just
like patented pharmaceuticals, patented technologies may become so
expensive that insurance companies will not cover them or will cover
them at lower rates.349 Thus, many of the higher costs of patented

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 67 Side B

10/08/2020 07:57:54

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-4\NYU402.txt

1006

unknown

Seq: 55

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5-OCT-20

9:22

[Vol. 95:952

technologies will fall on people with disabilities who may not be able
to afford them.
Finally, patent law imposes costs on downstream creators of further innovations.350 If a new innovator develops an improvement for
an existing patented product, she cannot simply make the improvement. She will likely have to either negotiate with the patent holder
and pay a license fee or wait until the patent has expired. Either way,
sequential innovation is costlier.351
Of course, firms bear some of the costs of the patent system. They
still must engage in expensive R&D which may not result in an invention.352 Even if the R&D efforts generate a patent, the IP right alone
does not guarantee a market for the product, so innovators run a risk
of not recouping their upfront costs.353 In addition, patent owners are
largely responsible for the enforcement costs of patent protection.354
If competitors are using the patented technology without a license, it
is the patent owner who is responsible for tracking them down and
filing lawsuits.355 Thus, detection and litigation costs will fall on patent
owners, impacting the effectiveness of the innovation incentive.356
That users bear many of the costs of the patent regime creates a
number of important implications for deciding whether and how to
adopt it, especially in the context of disability policy. First, as a matter
of efficiency and social welfare, patent law may not be appropriate
when users represent a small group of people with heterogenous
desires and limited ability to pay for innovations. As numerous
scholars have pointed out, patent incentives operate in response to
markets.357 Innovators are encouraged to develop products that are

10/08/2020 07:57:54

See Buccafusco, Bechtold & Sprigman, supra note 185, at 20.
Id.
352 INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 30, at 40 (noting that “some research
efforts do not pay off with certainty”).
353 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75
(2005) (noting that most issued patents have little or no commercial value).
354 See INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 30, at 197 (providing an overview of
patent litigation and enforcement). The government must still pay for the administrative
costs of the patent system, and some federal agencies will engage in patent infringement
detection. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 353, at 90 (“The government can and does
challenge some issued patents when the PTO re-examines a patent . . . .”).
355 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2018) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.”).
356 See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An
Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 322–24
(2014) (describing the economics of detection in IP).
357 See, e.g., Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 24, at 1942 (describing distorted incentives
in the patent market); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as
Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 169 (2016) [hereinafter Prizing
Insurance] (explaining the role of consumers’ willingness to pay in the drug market).
351
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likely to generate the widest possible demand in order to increase
sales. Yet while people with disabilities represent a large and growing
proportion of the population, their impairments and, thus, their needs
are likely to vary greatly. Thus, innovators might not find it sufficiently appealing to sell a product to a limited group of buyers when
there are broader markets available.358 This problem is further exacerbated by the relative poverty of people with disabilities.359 Because
many experience difficulty in obtaining and keeping high-paying jobs,
people with disabilities tend to be poorer than the average
American.360 Accordingly, people with disabilities may disproportionately fall into the group of consumers who would be willing to pay for
products if they were available at market prices, but who cannot
afford them at patent prices. Although innovations for disabled access
will often increase net welfare, the patent system may not succeed in
providing them.
Beyond efficiency, there are reasons to think that making people
with disabilities solely bear the costs of access is unfair.361 Arguments
about the distributional unfairness of the patent system have been
made in a number of contexts, especially those related to
pharmaceuticals, where the benefits of the system run to wealthy
populations and the costs to poorer ones.362 These arguments may be
even stronger in the disability context. From the perspective of the
social model of disability, where disabilities are caused by factors
largely outside of the control of people with disabilities,363 requiring
them to pay for technologies that overcome barriers may be viewed as
especially distributionally unfair.

User innovation has played an important role in the development
of new technologies for disabled access. People with disabilities have
produced a wide variety of innovations, from mouthsticks and spoon
358
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See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 24, at 1942.
Michael Palmer, Disability and Poverty: A Conceptual Review, 21 J. DISABILITY
POL’Y STUD. 210, 213 (2011); Pam Fessler, Why Disability and Poverty Still Go Hand in
Hand 25 Years After Landmark Law, NPR (July 23, 2015, 3:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2015/07/23/424990474/why-disability-and-poverty-still-go-hand-inhand-25-years-after-landmark-law.
360 Palmer, supra note 359, at 213.
361 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 349 (“The consensus of IP commentators is
that the user-pays principle of patents is in tension with distributive values.”).
362 See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the Patent System
Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 82 (2004).
363 See Samaha, supra note 21, at 1277–78 (discussing causation in the social model of
disability).
359
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See supra notes 102–11 and accompanying text.
For example, the payments to veterans to modify their homes probably helped spur
user innovations in home design. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 19.
366 See supra Sections II.C, III.B.
367 See, e.g., supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
368 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 176–78; see also Jackson, supra note 99.
369 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 176–77; Jackson, supra note 99.
370 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 176–78.
371 Id. at 178 (emphasis and citation omitted).
372 See VON HIPPEL, supra note 12, at 110–11 (discussing user innovations made
available for free).
365
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grips to wheelchairs and iron lungs.364 Some of these innovations have
then been patented, and, in some cases, they may have been supported by social welfare funding.365 But the vast majority of innovations were created solely out of a recognition of an unfilled personal
need.366 Again, the principal beneficiaries of user innovation are users
of the technology that have disabilities. With the benefits of publications like the Toomeyville Gazette and Paraplegia News, these technologies could be shared with a wide group of readers to enable them
to adapt it to their own lives.367
In addition, nondisabled users can also benefit from innovations
of users who have disabilities. For example, one of the most successful
recent product innovations is the OXO Good Grips line of kitchen
tools.368 Betsey Farber, an architect with arthritis, and her husband
Sam, the owner of a housewares business, created the wide rubber
grips on peelers and can openers to help Betsey cook.369 And while
these tools have certainly aided many people with arthritis and other
difficulties with gripping, they have also made cooking less physically
taxing for millions of people who are not disabled or who have impairments that do not rise to the level of a disability.370 As OXO touted in
one of their advertisements: “a universal design makes Good Grips
easy for everyone to hold on to and easy for everyone to use.”371
Because people with disabilities have to invest in the trial and
error that goes into any innovative activity, they are the ones who
principally bear its costs. Users with disabilities must invest in the necessary hardware and any specialized tools needed to create new technologies. And they must spend their own time conceiving of, testing,
and redesigning their ideas. The firms that engage in R&D in response
to patent law’s incentives also have substantial upfront innovation
costs. But, to a much greater extent than user innovators, firms can
rely on the possibility of two decades of selling products at higher than
marginal costs to recoup those expenses.372 Certainly, some users do
patent their inventions, as E&J’s story illustrates. But many user innovations are too simple to pass patent law’s novelty and nonobvious-

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 69 Side A

10/08/2020 07:57:54

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-4\NYU402.txt

October 2020]

unknown

Seq: 58

5-OCT-20

DISABILITY AND DESIGN

9:22

1009

ness hurdles,373 and many user innovators simply have no inclination
to go into business producing and selling their innovations.
Moreover, some user innovators object to the exclusivity that is at
the heart of the patent system.374 The examples from Toomey illustrate an ethic of sharing that is characteristic of many user communities.375 Innovations that can make people’s lives better are not
supposed to be locked away and sold for a profit.376 Other user innovators have seen the effects of the patent system on accessibility
design and are wary of the whole enterprise. Ralf Hotchkiss, mentioned above, was one of the disabled activists who worked as one of
the Nader’s Raiders to take down E&J’s monopoly in the 1970s.377
Afterward, he became an innovator, creating wheelchair designs that
could be made locally in developing countries.378 The company that he
founded, Whirlwind, explicitly avoids filing patents and it prevents
others from doing so. He explains:
We put things in the public domain. We publish them, and one year
after publication, nobody can patent it. It becomes public property. . . . [We want] to prevent anybody from monopolizing the ideas
at any time. . . . We want as much technology to be in the public
domain as possible, because we want progress.379
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373 This is not a normative judgment of their worth but rather a statement about the
complexity of the technology. See Loomer, supra note 113, at 30 (explaining why people
with disabilities need “simplified” equipment).
374 Compare VON HIPPEL, supra note 12, at 9–10 (providing an overview of the benefits
of freely revealing innovations), with RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 27, at 6
(describing the moral importance of exclusivity to some).
375 See, e.g., Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should
Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121,
1151–55 (2007) (explaining the culture of sharing in the culinary world).
376 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 355.
377 HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 12, 14–16.
378 Our History, WHIRLWIND WHEELCHAIR, https://whirlwindwheelchair.org/our-history
(last visited May 30, 2020).
379 HOTCHKISS, supra note 153, at 53.
380 Id. at 54.
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This response emerges directly from Hotchkiss’s experience with E&J.
He notes that the patent system “was instrumental in the creation of
the 30-year monopoly of the Everest & Jennings wheelchair, and
that’s an example of the problems of the patent system, especially in
an area where you have captive consumers, where the user is not necessarily the purchaser.”380
User innovation is another area in which users with disabilities
are primarily responsible for bearing the costs of access innovations.
As with patent rights, policymakers should consider both the welfare
and fairness consequences of this distribution of costs and benefits.
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3. Social Welfare

381

See
See
See
See
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supra notes 74–77, 87–89 and accompanying text.
supra note 348 and accompanying text.
383
supra notes 161–62.
384
Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives Versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in
DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 3, 95 n.2 (Carolyn L.
Weaver ed., 1991) (estimating that $30 billion in public funds were spent in 1989 on
disability insurance and supplemental security income, and the same amount was spent
through Medicare and Medicaid for people with disabilities).
382
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As Part II demonstrated, social welfare payments to people with
disabilities can provide an important demand-side innovation incentive for accessible technology. The government’s payments to people
with disabilities, and to veterans with disabilities in particular,
increased their ability to pay for innovations like improved prostheses
and manually controlled automobiles.381 This then meant that firms
had a greater likelihood of finding a market for new products and,
thus, the incentive to produce them. The benefits for innovation from
social welfare payments are widely distributed. The users who receive
the payments are better off because they can now afford technologies
that they otherwise could not. If the technology is patented, social
welfare payments can move some number of people with disabilities
out of the group of deadweight losses, because the payment allows
them to afford the product at its patent price.382
The firms that produce goods purchased by people with disabilities who receive government subsidies also stand to gain from those
payments. Again, E&J offers a clear example. The government subsidy for wheelchair purchases during the period of E&J’s monopoly
allowed them to sell substantially more wheelchairs at a much higher
price than they would have in the absence of the subsidy.383 Because
the subsidy boosts demand, suppliers will have a bigger market and
can get a higher price for their product. There may also be spillover
effects for nondisabled people, depending on whether the technologies that get produced have substantial value for them as well.
The starkest difference between social welfare payments and the
incentive regimes that have been discussed above is on the costs side.
Unlike patents and user innovation, where disabled users bear most of
the costs of innovation, social welfare payments are primarily paid for
by taxpayers. Social welfare payments come from federal or state governments’ general tax revenue, so the entire tax base, disabled and
nondisabled alike, will bear the burden.384 It is possible to raise the
revenue from a smaller tax base in order to reduce the incidence of
the tax, but so far, at least, governments do not seem to have experi-
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mented with this option.385 The wide incidence of taxes that benefit
people with disabilities will tend to make the costs of social welfare
payments especially salient to people who have to bear them. This was
the case in the decades following the Civil War where the size of pension payments to veterans became a major political issue.386 While
people with disabilities have been portrayed as the most “deserving”
welfare beneficiaries, to some people the payments they receive may
appear “special” or “extra” and thus frivolous and unnecessary.387
This is likely to be true when those payments are spent on technologies that go beyond mere functionality, such as more aesthetically
designed wheelchairs or ones that are only used for sports.388
The welfare effects of social welfare payments to people with disabilities are difficult to specify and likely depend on the assumptions
one makes about the welfare effects of redistributional taxation generally. This Article is not the place to reproduce those debates.389 The
fairness and distributional effects of social welfare payments are
somewhat more straightforward, at least for proponents of the social
model of disability.390 If nondisabled Americans are getting the benefits of living in a world that has been designed for them, then perhaps
it is only fair that they compensate people with disabilities for the
challenges that the world produces. Social welfare payments that
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385 It is not entirely clear what grounds for minimizing the incidence of the tax might
exist. Perhaps if the government thought that some parties were particularly responsible
for causing disabilities, it might want to tax them most heavily to encourage them to
internalize the effects of their behavior.
386 See LINKER, supra note 47, at 100 (providing that by 1870 the government had spent
$500,000 on replacement limbs for veterans and describing public suspicion about how
veterans spent the money); id. at 12, 21–34 (documenting the general anti-pension
sentiment after the Civil War); Blanck & Millender, supra note 65, at 3–4 (noting that
following the Civil War, war pensions amounted to as much as forty-two percent of the
federal budget).
387 This was the concern of some in the VA about the provision of automobiles to some
disabled veterans. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 33; see also Crossley, supra note 291,
at 892 (providing that, within the workplace context, some people see accommodations
requested by persons with disabilities as a petition for an “extra” benefit).
388 Cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 146 (noting that opposition to accessibility
regulations and proposed futuristic accessible designs “left a lasting impression of access as
excess, or a demand over and above ‘regular’ design”). For a discussion of modern
developments in the aesthetics and athletic use of mobility aids, see id. at 191–99.
389 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 15–16 (broadly describing the debates
concerning disability welfare); Manasi Deshpande, Does Welfare Inhibit Success? The
Long-Term Effects of Removing Low-Income Youth from the Disability Rolls, 106 AM.
ECON. REV. 3300 (2016).
390 But see generally Samaha, supra note 21 (critiquing the normative and policy
limitations of the social model of disability).
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come from general revenue are one way of accomplishing this
redistribution.391
4. Antidiscrimination Law

10/08/2020 07:57:54

391 See Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 4 (calling for “direct and sustained government
interventions such as the public funding and provision of benefits”).
392 See supra Section IV.B.
393 See supra notes 291–95.
394 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
395 See Berven & Blanck, supra note 16, at 18–19 (“These core findings suggest that
ADA implementation is affecting the AT consumer market in economically positive ways
and is creating profit-making opportunities for inventors and manufacturers in the
sector.”).
396 Emens, supra note 20, at 849 (discussing how accessible work environments may lead
to lower turnover).
397 Id. at 861.
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Federal disability policy in the last quarter of the twentieth century adopted a different approach to encouraging access innovations—antidiscrimination laws that mandate the provision of
reasonable accommodations and accessible environments.392 Like
social welfare payments, antidiscrimination laws operate on the
demand side of the market, but antidiscrimination laws make governments and property owners the consumers of accessible technology
rather than people with disabilities.393 Antidiscrimination laws
increase regulated entities’ willingness to pay for assistive technologies by raising the costs of noncompliance.394
Once again, the chief beneficiaries of antidiscrimination laws’
incentive effects are people with disabilities. Because regulated parties
are more likely to invest in providing accessibility, people with disabilities will find a world that is more accommodating of their needs. They
can seek employment and leisure with greater confidence that their
impairments will not be a hindrance. Some firms may also benefit
from antidiscrimination laws, either if they are selling products that
aid compliance395 or if the adaptations they make to their environments generally improve productivity and employee welfare.396
Importantly, antidiscrimination laws may have the largest spillover benefits of any of these regimes for nondisabled people. Most of
the innovations generated by patent law, user innovation, and social
welfare benefits are individual-level technologies that are used by a
single person at a time. By contrast, when regulated entities create
accessible buildings, buses, and public spaces, they are typically
through environment-level technologies. Everyone is free to use curb
cuts or ramps whether they need them or not.397 And many people
without disabilities may still obtain benefits from accessible bathroom
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See id. at 861–63.
Id. at 880.
400 See, e.g., Shinall, supra note 319, at 3–4 (discussing the costs of complying with the
ADA for employers).
401 Many accessible designs for newly constructed buildings will be no more costly than
inaccessible designs. Ramps do not necessarily cost more than stairs, for example.
402 See R ICHARD A. E PSTEIN , F ORBIDDEN G ROUNDS : T HE C ASE A GAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480 (1992) (stating that the ADA requires “major
expenditures” out of general revenue funds to pay for accessible transit systems).
403 Id. at 487; Schuman, supra note 313.
404 See supra notes 279, 281 and accompanying text.
405 See Stein, supra note 296, at 89 n.49 (noting, for example, the “Empire State
Building complied with the ADA’s regulations only after being targeted for litigation by
the Department of Justice”).
399
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stalls or reorganizations of the workplace.398 By reshaping the environment, antidiscrimination laws can generate positive externalities
for people other than those they intend to benefit. Nonetheless, many
of these benefits may go unnoticed by nondisabled people. As
Elizabeth Emens notes, because nondisabled people do not see the
ADA as having been enacted “for them,” they may not appreciate the
many ways in which it aids them.399
The costs of antidiscrimination laws’ incentive effects fall largely
on regulated entities, including state and local governments (i.e. taxpayers) and private businesses.400 They are responsible for building or
rebuilding accessible spaces, and these changes may impose additional
costs.401 Governments may be responsible for paying for changes to
their transport systems, either by altering their existing fleets of buses
and trains or by supplying paratransit options.402 Beyond these economic costs, regulated entities have argued that antidiscrimination
laws impose costs on their autonomy by limiting the ways in which
they spend their money, use their property, and associate with
others.403 Even if the laws make economic sense, the argument goes,
they should not coerce parties into taking actions that they do not
prefer.
Although regulated entities bear the costs of complying with
antidiscrimination laws, people with disabilities and the government
bear the costs of enforcing them. If a municipal government or local
business is not complying with its legal obligations to remove barriers
to access, either individual parties or a governmental agency must
bring suit to demand a change.404 In some cases, this means that a
regulated entity may not comply with the law until it receives notification of a pending legal action.405 Monitoring for violations is difficult
and time consuming, and legal actions are expensive, complicated, and
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406 Jack Achtenberg, “Crips” Unite to Enforce Symbolic Laws: Legal Aid for the
Disabled: An Overview, 4 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 161, 175–78 (1975)
(showcasing complications and barriers that persons with disabilities face to bring a legal
action).
407 See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 236, at 19–20 (discussing employment actions).
408 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 190.
409 See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 318 (noting that employment rates for
workers with disabilities fell after the enactment of the ADA); DeLeire, supra note 318
(same).
410 See supra notes 283–86 and accompanying text.
411 See GUFFEY, supra note 2, at 156 (noting the discomfort of business owners,
architects, and designers with the ADA after it was passed); Schartz, Hendricks & Blanck,
supra note 293, at 347 (reporting that employers’ belief of high costs is inconsistent with
empirical evidence).
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often simply not worth it.406 The returns to individual plaintiffs and
their attorneys are typically small, because the outcome of even successful litigation may only be injunctive relief.407 Finally, as Bess
Williamson argues, “[i]n the post-ADA world, when the primary
means of enforcement for access regulations has been individual or
class action lawsuit, the perception of access as excess has merged
with public skepticism about personal litigation.”408 Thus, there may
be substantial underenforcement of the innovation incentives that federal disability law creates.
Determining the precise welfare or fairness outcomes of antidiscrimination policy is futile, but some generalizations are possible.
Some scholars have found that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
provision in Title I has actually reduced employment for people with
disabilities, meaning firms have found ways to avoid hiring them
without generating liability.409 If a firm can avoid having employees
with disabilities, it will not have to expend resources on accommodations. But Titles II and III do not work in the same way. A place of
accommodation, like a restaurant or store, cannot avoid legal obligations by claiming that no people with disabilities patronize the establishment. These titles apply to all businesses and, thus, do not create
perverse incentives to avoid accommodating people with
disabilities.410
There are also reasons to believe that antidiscrimination laws
have had a positive impact on net social welfare by requiring accessibility measures that are good for businesses but that the businesses
might not make on their own. Business owners may believe that the
costs of accommodations are far higher than they actually are and that
the number of patrons who will benefit from them is much lower.411
Legal regulation may drive them to take actions that are self-serving
but about which they are mistaken.
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Finally, antidiscrimination laws may help solve collective action
problems by focusing on environment-level innovations. Many of the
people who use the supermarket would be better off if the supermarket introduced ramps and curb cuts, and the benefits that those
people receive might far exceed the implementation costs. But
because the value to any individual user is small, and because users
are not typically allowed to make their own curb cuts or install their
own ramps, compelling the supermarket to make the change may be
the only way to generate the welfare enhancing result. When combined with the tax credits to businesses for installing accessible features, the accommodation may no longer even prove to be a loss for
the supermarket.412
B. Innovation Distortions
One of the principal lessons from this analysis is that various legal
regimes can distort innovation incentives. Of course, some legal
regimes, like patent law, are intended to distort innovation incentives
in particular ways. This does not mean to imply that any or all of these
distortions are normatively unjustifiable. Nonetheless, policymakers
must not only focus on the relative costs and benefits of different legal
regimes but also on how those regimes may affect the direction of
innovation. Here I consider three different ways in which these
regimes may have distorting effects, including the role of intellectual
property rights on investment, the role of intermediaries, and the salience of costs and benefits.

The distortive effects of patent law have become commonplace in
IP scholarship,413 and the narrative of accessible design reinforces
these arguments. Patent law provides a supply-side incentive to producers of new technology, but the size of the incentive varies
according to the size of the relevant market.414 Thus, inventors will
tend to direct their innovative activity towards problems that promise
to be lucrative.415 This typically means being able to sell a single
product to a lot of relatively wealthy consumers. Innovations for

10/08/2020 07:57:54

412 Seto & Buhai, supra note 288, at 1126 (referencing a Government Accountability
Office report noting the generally positive perception from business representatives of a
barrier removal deduction).
413 See, e.g., Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 24, at 1944–45; Sachs, Prizing Insurance,
supra note 357, at 160–70 (regarding innovation distortions concerning patents and FDA
regulations).
414 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 320.
415 See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 24, at 1942.
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416 See SHEPARD & KAREN, supra note 144, at 4 (noting that nearly all wheelchair
purchases are at least partly subsidized by the government and private insurers).
417 Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 24, at 1945–46.
418 Id.
419 Loomer, supra note 113, at 30.
420 Kapczynski and Syed note that sometimes patent holders might affirmatively fight
non-patent solutions to problems: “[W]e can expect those who specialize in the use of
exclusive rights to recoup their investment to exhibit competitive hostility to inventions
that solve the same problem through nonexcludable means.” Kapczynski & Syed, supra
note 24, at 1946.
421 In the copyright context, these would probably count as ideas rather than
expressions. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (noting that the copyright on a
book does not secure the exclusive right to use the ideas presented in it, as “[t]he use of the
art is a totally different thing from a publication of the book explaining it”).
422 Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The
World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 774 (2006).
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accessibility, however, do not usually fit this model. People with disabilities often have heterogeneous needs and low ability to pay for
innovations. Even the E&J wheelchair, the most successful patented
product in the Article, would not have been affordable to many of
them without subsidies.416
Moreover, the availability of exclusive rights for patented inventions will tend to direct innovators’ efforts towards the sorts of designs
that can receive patent protection and away from those that cannot.417
If a firm has a set amount of money for R&D, it will tend to pursue
innovation pathways that may lead to patents rather than to technologies that are not excludable.418 Alice Loomer, writing in the
Toomeyville Gazette, expressed exactly this concern, noting that while
people with disabilities often need simple and cheap devices, firms
tend to create complicated ones that are eligible for patent protection.419 Firms might also be less interested in developing the innovations that Timothy Nugent produced.420 Nugent’s studies of the
physical needs of people with disabilities would not be protectable by
either patent or copyright law.421 Although they were enormously valuable for clarifying the requirements of accessible design, profitseeking firms might not see much value in creating them. It is worth
noting that Nugent was a university professor, one of the groups of
people who are generally tasked with producing “open science”
knowledge rather than functional inventions.422
These factors imply that patent law’s basis in market value can
drive producers’ incentives away from activities that are socially
optimal and towards ones that are privately beneficial. This is not to
suggest that patents are an inappropriate tool for incentivizing accessible design. Grants, prizes, and taxes all produce their own relative
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distortions as well.423 Policymakers need to be aware of these distortions when making decisions about which regimes to use.
2. Intermediaries

423

10/08/2020 07:57:54

See supra notes 361–62.
See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
425 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
426 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
427 See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
428 See supra Section III.C. For evidence that payers can sometimes have salutary effects
on healthcare innovation, see Eisenberg & Price, supra note 14, at 5.
429 See Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 23 (“Antidiscrimination requirements can prohibit
employers from discriminating against qualified people with disabilities who apply for jobs,
but they cannot put people with disabilities in a position to apply and be qualified for jobs
in the first place.”).
430 Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the
Promotion of Welfare, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 98, 103 (Ben Depoorter & Peter S. Menell eds., 2019); Wendy Netter
Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1274–76 (2017)
424
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Perhaps the most important innovation distortion disclosed by
this analysis is the one that arises when intermediaries between producers and users get to choose which products are made and which
are not. As we have seen, the intermediaries’ preferences often do not
match up with those of users, driving innovation towards products that
do not maximize user value.424 Early twentieth-century rehabilitation
specialists demanded that people with mobility impairments learn to
walk with crutches or prostheses, even though many people found
these objects uncomfortable and inefficient.425 Automobile subsidies
for World War II veterans often did not allow them to purchase cars
that actually worked for their needs.426 Healthcare payers like the VA,
Medicaid, and Medicare influenced consumers’ options for wheelchairs and the opportunities for E&J’s competitors to release products.427 Consumers were not allowed to shop for the products that
would suit them best, because intermediaries would only sanction payments for some models. And once E&J had worked with the
intermediaries to narrow the specifications to products that resembled
its own chairs, other firms had difficulty entering the market.428
Finally, because governments and firms stand between producers and
users of accessible spaces, the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
requirement can mean that chosen designs are not the ones that are
most helpful or convenient for people with disabilities.429
These distortions can create challenges for optimizing innovation
incentives, whether for disabled access or more broadly. On one hand,
consumers may not have perfectly rational preferences for the products and technologies they use.430 And the private value that people
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obtain from a technology does not always match its social value.431
Policymakers might want to be especially cautious about paternalistically or self-interestedly substituting their judgments for those of
people with disabilities. Even if they are doing their best, the literature on affective forecasting errors and hedonic psychology suggests
that nondisabled people often do a poor job of understanding what it
is like to live with a disability.432 Of course, in many situations, the
intermediaries will not even try to choose what is best for people with
disabilities, instead choosing options that are best for their own interests. Accordingly, policymakers should be wary of incentive regimes
where users with disabilities are not the purchasers of innovations.
3. Salience Biases
Different innovation regimes can vary according to how salient
their tradeoffs are. With respect to costs, both social welfare payments
and antidiscrimination laws may appear to produce salient costs for
the people who have to pay them. Citizens whose taxes must fund
welfare payments directly or municipal renovations indirectly may be
aware of those costs. In particular, they may see these taxes as helping
other people.433 Those citizens may bring their concerns to bear on
elected officials. When regulated businesses must make accommodations or alterations for people with disabilities, the requirements may
also be highly salient, and they may view them as burdensome. Ultimately, however, data suggest that compliance costs are often much
lower than regulated entities anticipate, leading to salient but skewed
cost estimates.434
42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 73 Side B
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(explaining how outside factors affect a patient’s ability to choose what is best for him or
her).
431 For example, while users might prefer an innovation that generates $2000 of value
and costs $1500, a social planner might prefer an innovation that generates $1800 of value
at a cost of $500. For purposes of this paper, I take no position on which of these outcomes
is normatively preferable.
432 See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 326, at 760 (stating that “research
demonstrates that people without disabilities tend to view the prospect of life with a
disability as far less enjoyable than people with disabilities themselves report”); Peter A.
Ubel, George Loewenstein, Norbert Schwarz & Dylan Smith, Misimagining the
Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. S57 (2005).
433 See Crossley, supra note 291, at 892; Emens, supra note 20, at 880.
434 One survey indicates that more than half of accommodations were costless to
employers, while the median expenditure on the costly ones was only five hundred dollars.
Shinall, supra note 319, at 4 (citing JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, WORKPLACE
ACCOMMODATIONS: LOW COST, HIGH IMPACT 2 (2013), http://AskJAN.org/media/
downloads/LowCostHighImpact.pdf).
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Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 371.
See supra notes 396–99.
437 See Schartz, Hendricks & Blanck, supra note 293, at 347 (arguing that firms often
overestimate the costs of accessibility renovations).
438 While the actual odds of experiencing disability for insurance purposes are unclear,
see Ron Lieber, The Odds of a Disability Are Themselves Odd, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/your-money/life-and-disability-insurance/
06money.html, disability can come from many experiences, such as breaking a bone,
cancer, or mental illness.
436
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By contrast, the patent system’s costs tend to be much less salient,
even to those who have to pay them. Monopoly prices are often hard
to see because there may not be other products against which a consumer can compare patented products. And from a legislator’s perspective, patents have almost no costs because they require so little
revenue.435 All of the costs are paid by users and downstream innovators. Similarly, the costs of user innovation are fully veiled to everyone
except the users engaging in R&D. From the perspective of government finances, the most important access innovation of the twentieth
century, the E&J wheelchair, cost absolutely nothing.
Salience distortions can also arise on the benefits side of innovation regimes. Many nondisabled people benefit from accessible
design, but they often will not appreciate it.436 And the benefits of
many accessibility innovations may be hard to see before the design
exists. Thus, people’s perception of the value of investing in innovation is likely to be skewed. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are
most likely to produce these distortions, because they operate on both
the costs side and the benefits side. Nondisabled people and firms will
find the costs that they pay for access to be especially salient, and they
may be prone to exaggerating their magnitude.437 But they will tend to
ignore the benefits that they themselves receive from access. They
may not notice the ways in which ramps and curb cuts make life easier
for everyone or how universally designed kitchen tools improve their
lives as well. Moreover, they may ignore the relatively high
probability that they will one day acquire a temporary or permanent
disability.438
The foregoing discussion has offered a comparative analysis of
the various means by which policymakers can stimulate accessible
design. The toolbox is far larger than scholars have previously
imagined. In many ways, these added features may help policymakers
shape accessible innovations in a more tailored fashion. But in other
ways, they will cause challenges, as one regime interacts with another
in unpredictable ways. This Article does not attempt the challenging
normative analysis of which regimes should be favored and how much
society should be willing to invest in encouraging accessible design.
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Doing so requires specifying and arguing about underlying normative
commitments about welfarism, fairness, and the value of autonomy,
among others.
There are several important takeaways from this analysis. First,
demand-side innovation incentives can be as important as supply-side
innovation incentives, and they address some issues with distribution
and collective action that supply-side incentives produce. Next, policymakers should attend to whether they are encouraging individuallevel innovations or environmental-level innovations. These will vary
in their effectiveness depending on the circumstances. Sometimes it
may be easier to install ramps and curb cuts than to provide people
with stair-climbing wheelchairs. Other times, assisting a person with a
disability by providing a particular prosthesis may prove to be the
better approach. Finally, policymakers should be aware of the distortions and salience biases that influence the pace and direction of innovation and the public’s commitment to providing incentives for it.
CONCLUSION
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439 See, e.g., Bradley Allan Areheart & Michael Ashley Stein, Integrating the Internet, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2015) (arguing that the internet is a place of public
accommodation); Blake E. Reid, Internet Architecture and Disability, 95 IND. L.J. 591
(2020) (proposing a framework that would better account for the internet in disability law);
Caterina Sganga, Disability, Right to Culture and Copyright: Which Regulatory Option?, 29
INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 88 (2015) (offering a framework that reconciles
copyright law with increased access to knowledge for people with disabilities).
440 See Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Performance-Based Regulation, 50 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 525 (2017).
441 See, e.g., Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401
(2016).
442 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
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I hope that scholars and policymakers will find the above analysis
valuable, both as they think about the accessibility of the physical
world and as they increasingly turn towards the accessibility of the
digital world. Scholars are doing important work on the digital access
front,439 and the tradeoffs between different innovation regimes can
provide insight for that discussion.
These findings also apply to innovation policy more broadly. As
policymakers consider how best to incentivize new developments in
environmental protection,440 autonomous vehicles,441 and data privacy,442 they must be aware of the interplay between multiple legal
regimes. In each of these and many more cases, regulators face a panoply of choices among legal mechanisms. This Article calls for
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scholars to look beyond their standard sub-disciplinary boundaries in
order to recognize the fuller range of policy levers that are available
and the costs and benefits that they create.

42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 75 Side A
10/08/2020 07:57:54

